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This thesis is an in depth analysis of cost variances in Naval Air Reserve
units flying the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18. The purpose of the thesis is to
identify, analyze and quantify the effect of variances in the cost per flight hour of
the Naval Air Reserve's Flying Hour Program. The study begins with a review
of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System which is used to justify and
fund the Flying Hour Program. Then three different methods of determining
Flying Hour Program requirements are described. The four components of cost
per hour within the Flying Hour Program (Fuel, Organizational Maintenance
Activity, Intermediate Maintenance Activity and Aviation Depot Level
Repairables) are defined. Finally, using regression analysis techniques, these four
components of F/A-18 cost data are analyzed on the basis of the intensity of
aircraft utilization: flight hours. The analysis includes a regression model to
provide budgeters at the headquarters or squadron level the ability to predict
aircraft maintenance and fuel costs given a utilization rate. The thesis concludes
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The Navy and Marine Corps operate forward to
project a positive American image, build
foundations for viable coalitions, enhance
diplomatic contacts, reassure friends, and
demonstrate U.S. power and resolve. Naval Forces
will be prepared to fight promptly and effectively,
but they will serve in an equally valuable way by
engaging day-to-day as peacekeepers in the defense
of American interests. [Ref. 1: p. 4]
Forward and day-to-day operations are the key phrases in
the above quote from the 1992 mission statement for the Navy
and Marine Corps. Signed by the then Secretary of the Navy,
Mr. Sean O'Keefe, this paragraph sketches the Naval Service's
direction for the future. In spite of the draw-down of naval
personnel and shrinking military budgets, the Navy and Marine
Corps will continue to be underway projecting the will of the
American people overseas and protecting those interests deemed
necessary by the command authority of the United States
government
.
To meet these operational commitments, the U.S. Congress
amends and approves the President's annual defense budget
request which includes funding for the Department of the Navy.
Within the Navy's budget, funding is assigned to the Naval
Flight Hour Program. This funding provides the means for
Naval Aviation, one instrument of fleet power projection, to
train and operate on a day-to-day basis. The Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is the process by
which managers analyze their costs, predict requirements, and
justify and forward their requests for funding. But every
fiscal year the budget must be validated: the resultant
funding must be efficiently and effectively executed at every
level so that each training and operational sortie maximizes
the investment being made by the American taxpayer. Because
the funding levels are shrinking and the operational and
training requirements for the remaining units are not, it has
become even more critical that program managers use every tool
available to responsibly manage the taxpayer dollars in their
care .
The specific appropriation within the Department of
Defense's budget from which the training and operational
forces of the Navy receive their funding is labeled the
Operations and Maintenance, Navy or 0&M,N. This account
provides funding to all operating components: surface,
subsurface, aviation, Navy and Marine Corps. In terms of the
aviation component, all operational and training squadrons of
the Active and Reserve Navy and Marine Corps and many of the
maintenance activities are funded from this appropriation.
In preparing its request for funding, the Navy estimates
the number of flight hours that will be required to ensure
that pilots and squadrons are combat ready. The estimated
costs incurred to support these hours are computed under the
headings of: Fuel, Organizational Maintenance Activities,
j Intermediate Maintenance Activities and Aviation Depot Level
Repair. These funds then provide for land-based and carrier-
borne squadron training, administration, support, maintenance
and operations.
Once approved by the U.S. Congress, the Flight Hour
Program is a monetary cap constraining the maximum operational
and training costs for all naval aviation assets. As this
figure is passed down through the echelons of command, many
managers will withhold a percentage, divide the remainder and
pass it to their reporting commands. At the squadron level,
managers track their funding to maximize mission readiness and
spend exactly 100% of their allotted funding. Any command
exceeding its funding must petition Congress for additional
funding, unless the commands they report to can make up the
difference from the withheld percentage or other units'
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excesses. However, few commands spend less than their
allotted amount, fearing a corresponding reduction in funding
the following year.
There are few differences between active and reserve
squadrons. Since the data forming the basis of this thesis is
provided by Commander Naval Air Reserve Force, the focus will
be on the processes and costs affecting the United States
Naval Air Reserve. The Naval Air Reserves have the same
training requirements and fly the same missions as their
active duty counterparts. The Reserves' budgeting procedures
also closely parallel the active duty. In both components,
the failure to accurately manage funds and predict costs
driven by the operational tempo and continuing cut backs in
funding may cause aviation units to cease training and local
operations so deployed units can continue to fly on the
remaining funding.
Although the methods may change over time, the end result
is the same. At every level, from the President and the
Congress of the United States down to the Mission Commander
flying off an aircraft carrier's pitching deck, managing
funding for maximum combat readiness and operational
capabilities is the goal_.____ The security of the United States,
the fighter pilot's life and, finally, mission readiness all
depend on maximizing scarce resources to get the most out of
every flight, whether the task is training a nugget pilot in
sunny Pensacola or flying in combat on a dark and stormy night
over hostile territory.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this thesis is to add to the
understanding of flight hour costs and the causes and effects
of various decisions and factors influencing them. The end
result of this analysis is to expand and improve the methods
available to Flight Hour Program managers tasked with
efficiently budgeting scarce appropriated funds.
The questions to be answered by this thesis are:
1. Can statistical methods be used to model and
accurately predict either the total annual flight hour cgst-s-
or any of the four components making up the total flight hour
costs for the Naval Air Reserve units flying the McDonnell
Douglas F/A-18?
2. If a statistical analysis is a useful tool for
evaluating flight hour costs for the Naval Air Reserves, what
are the essential variables for predicting total annual costs
and can they be applied to other active or reserve squadron
type/model/series aircraft?
3. Given the present austere fiscal environment, can
mathematical techniques, like regression analysis, lead to
quantitative improvements in the budgeting process?
C. SCOPE
Mathematical techniques are used to identify, analyze and
define a working model of aircraft costs per flight hour
(CPH) . Ideally, for a model to be a reliable fiscal
management tool, it must be able to predict, within an
acceptable margin for error, the end of fiscal year CPH for a
given Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) aircraft. As the year
progresses funding managers are trying to exactly spend to
their funding targets, while maintaining maximum readiness.
Therefore prediction accuracy will increase as the number of
data points increase and the end of the fiscal year nears, the
goal is to generate an acceptable outcome based on
mathematically identified trends and with only two or three
months of data.
Where possible, an analysis of the factors contributing
to the costs of flying naval aircraft is conducted and
relationships identified to aid in a better understanding of
the requirements for the differing T/M/S aircraft and their
missions. This information may then be used as a basis for
predicting the change in costs due to changes in the variables
affecting Cost per Hour.
Data used in the thesis was provided by Commander Naval
Air Reserve Force as reported to them by the various Navy and
Marine Corps Reserve F/A-18 squadrons. Although the general
assumptions used and conclusions of this thesis may apply to
other T/M/S aircraft, the differences in T/M/S, missions, and
maintenance practices may be significant. Additional research
will be required prior to applying assumptions and conclusions
from this thesis to other aircraft and to differing
situations. It is also important to note that the costs used
are exclusive of aircraft lifecycle, research and development,
and procurement costs. Pay and benefits for the men and women
that maintain and fly the aircraft and associated costs are




Flight hour cost information and the corresponding number
of flight hours flown by the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve
F/A-18 squadrons were provided by Commander Naval Air Reserve
Force. The cost information was tracked by its four component
parts: Fuel, Organizational Maintenance Activity (OMA)
,
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA), and Aviation Depot
Level Repairable Maintenance (AVDLR) . These four components
of cost information, for Fiscal Years (FY) 1991 through 1994,
are analyzed and form the basis for the resultant mathematical
model
.
The totals and component parts of the data are analyzed
by Fiscal Year for trends and, using available statistical
programs, studied by the methods of regression analysis. The
results of the model are then compared to the results of
explained.
Information supporting the mathematical model and
explaining maintenance relationships and practices impacting
flight hour costs were obtained by interviewing personnel
active in the fields of aircraft maintenance and cost
management and tracking. The interviews were conducted via
telephone and in person with personnel from Patrol Squadron
65, representing the Organizational Maintenance Activity
perspective, Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department,
Point Mugu, for the Intermediate Maintenance Activity view,
and Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific, San Diego for the
Depot Level perspective. Other interviews conducted included
personnel from the Office of the Comptroller, Naval Air
Reserve, Point Mugu and Commander Naval Air Reserve, New
Orleans. Policies and procedures that helped to explain
trends, anomalies and results formed the basis of the




This thesis is divided into six chapters.
Chapter I clarifies the purpose of the documented
research by providing the background, relevance, benefits and
need for efficient flight hour budgeting. It states the
research questions, the scope of the research, the objectives
of the analysis, and the methodology employed in conducting
the research. It also contains an overview of the thesis and
its structure.
Chapter II reviews the present budgeting process,
reporting, methodologies, and the importance of accurate cost
per flight hour estimation at the Type Commander and
operational levels. It introduces the three different methods
used to predict Flight Hour Program requirements, their
strengths, weaknesses, any assumptions and their potential
effect on the results of the analysis in the following
chapters
.
Chapter III presents the alternative methods for
analyzing data and predicting trends and influences. The
principles of regression analysis, the statistical procedure
used to mathematically evaluate the data in this thesis, are
highlighted. The importance of the entering variables and
their meanings are defined. The potential impact of any
simplifying assumptions are explored.
Chapter IV documents the modifications and assumptions
used to modify each of the four cost pools for use in the
analysis. The influences and potential sources of variation
and their importance are introduced.
Chapter V summarizes the results of the regression
analysis of the squadron data. The probable meaning and
forces influencing the outcomes are explored for each of the
cost pools.
Chapter VI presents the conclusions drawn from the
research: empirical data drawn from the model and qualitative
information obtained from the comparison of the various
methodologies. There are also some suggestions for further
research in related areas.

II. BUDGETING FOR FLIGHT HOURS
A. INTRODUCTION
Development of flying hour requirements for
the services has become more important as aircraft
and missions have become more complex and budgets
have grown more constrained. At the present time,
the services develop their flying hour programs via
the exercise of professional judgement. They
decide what training events must be repeated with
what frequency in order to achieve and maintain
various levels of proficiency. This is a
reasonable approach, but it leaves one with a
flying hour requirement that is not explicitly
validated in terms of the proficiency or safety of
aircrews. The scarcity of resources has
increasingly led to the request that flying hour
budgets be justified in terms of improved
operational capability. In other words, those
responsible for the budget-- in the services, in
OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) , and in
the Congress want better evidence about what we are
getting for the money we spend on the flying hour
program. In the absence of such evidence, it is
likely to become increasingly difficult to justify
funding for the flying hour program. [Ref. 2: p.
11]
The challenge to military financial managers is clear.
The end of the cold war, like the end of every other war in
American history, is driving cutbacks in the military. The
recent military successes (Desert Storm, etc.) and the lack of
a formidable, identifiable enemy are raising questions about
the future need for and the extent and capabilities of today's
armed forces. Funding cuts by the Executive and Legislative
branches of government are in support of "the People's" desire
for shifting tax dollars for use by non-military government
programs. This "Peace Dividend" is shrinking the military
infrastructure and making the military budget manager's job
more challenging.
The managers of the Navy's Flying Hour Program (FHP) are
constrained by two conflicting requirements: maximizing fleet
aviation's readiness in order to maintain the highest levels
of safety and efficiency, and maximizing the use of the
decreased funds available. Because the different
type/model/series (T/M/S) aircraft have varying costs per hour
(CPH) to operate, the limited dollars appear to buy more in
those squadrons costing less. Minimum aircrew flight hour and
tasking requirements for the various T/M/S aircraft drive a
more equitable distribution of the funds, however. Drastic
cutbacks in funding have overcome many years of planning and
have necessitated radical measures, new techniques and
creative management to stay within the budget.
Despite the drawdown of American forces and funding
cutbacks, a relentless operational tempo and various
contingencies have required the continuing presence of naval
assets around the globe. These operations have resulted in an
unplanned increase in costs. Normally increases in costs can
be offset by increased funding from Congress through a
supplemental appropriation. But the already tight budgets,
watchful constituents, and federal spending caps have
precluded an increase in funding, and no extra money has been
forthcoming from Congress. By the beginning of the fourth
quarter of Fiscal Year 1994, l it was clear that there was not
enough money for the Active Duty forces to continue operating
to the end of the Fiscal Year (FY) . So that units could
continue to fly and operate while forward-deployed at the
various trouble spots throughout the world, the difficult
decision was made to cut back the training operations of units
in the at-home portion of their operational cycles. [Ref . 3]
Standing down a squadron for two to three months has several
xThe fiscal year begins 1 October of the year prior and
ends on 3 September of the given year. So the beginning of
the fourth quarter would have been 1 July 1994.
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negative impacts: aircrew and material readiness drop, morale
plummets, safety drops, and tension rises, especially as rusty
pilots start flying again.
The Reserve forces were also affected by the lack of
funding. Despite standing down one of only two Reserve
Airwings and its associated squadrons sooner than mandated,
the Reserves had a significant FHP funding shortfall. By
September, all drilling Reservists were asked to forgo pay for
the last drill weekend of the Fiscal Year.
This chapter looks at the funding process through a
description of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) and an overview of the execution phase. It will
outline the Flying Hour Program, some different approaches to
funding, some of the problems associated with the Navy's
Flying Hour Program (FHP) , and the importance of an accurate
estimation of costs per flight hour.
B. THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM
The PPBS is a process by which the federal government
identifies, prioritizes and allocates funds to the wide range
of public programs mandated by the Congress of the United
States. As a public good provided for the security of the
people and institutions of the United States, the Navy and the
Navy's FHP are funded through the PPBS. The complexity of the
PPBS system precludes an in-depth analysis of it; however, a
basic knowledge of the process is required to fully understand
the challenges and some of the problems inherent in managing
the Navy's FHP.
Although not always concerned with the same FY, some
function of PPBS is in process the year around. As the
present year's budget is being executed, the next year's is in
the approval process, and planning for the programs that make
up the budget occurs as much as six years ahead of time. The
entire process is designed to coordinate the national planning
11
efforts across the services and departments, translate those
plans into actual military force requirements, which can then
be codified into prioritized budgetary demands so that
resources can be allocated to meet those demands and stay
within the confines of the discretionary portion of the
national budget.
In 1990, the Congress passed the Budget Enforcement Act
(BEA)
,
mandating deficit reduction measures on both the
discretionary programs and the entitlement portions of the
national budget. [Ref. 4: p. C-3] Entitlements are those
programs approved by Congress that grow, or shrink, based on
participation of those entitled to the prescribed benefits.
These programs represent funding requirements and can only be
changed or rescinded by a change in the law, an act of
Congress. Entitlements receive funding even without specific
action by Congress. The funding for discretionary programs
have to be approved every year. Without this approval, money
is not available and the programs actually end. The
Department of Defense (DOD) is just such a program and as
such, without a budget, aircraft do not fly, ships do not sail
and the people do not get paid.
The BEA limits the entitlement programs to zero-growth
after considering inflation. The real deficit reduction
efforts are made within the budgets for discretionary
programs. The discretionary programs are sorted into one of
three categories: international, domestic and defense. Each
of the categories have spending limits imposed on both budget
authority and outlays 2 . These spending caps are below the
2Outlays are the actual payments made from the current or
a prior years obligation. Some appropriation accounts allow
for multi-year payments: long term projects, aircraft carrier
construction for instance, are approved in a given year, but
construction payments continue until project completion.




baseline, considering inflation, set by zero growth.
Discretionary funds can be redirected between the three
categories, so that any growth in one is offset by further
reduction in one of the other two. Since 1990, deeper cuts in
the discretionary category labeled defense have been used to
support the other two. It is within this context that DOD has
to design its budgets and distribute the approved, or




As the name implies, planning is the first phase of the
PPBS process. The purpose of this phase is to generate long-
range national security strategies and policies based on
threats to areas of national interest. Input is taken from
the various intelligence agencies, the Commanders-in-Chief of
various unified commands, Type Commanders, the National
Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to assess
areas of national interest and the likely threats.
After the threats are identified and strategies generated
to counter them, then a suitable force structure can be
developed to reach the strategic goals and support the desired
policies. The services are tasked with developing the
programs needed to achieve the required force structure. The
Defense Resources Planning Board (DRPB) oversees the entire
process through the budgeting phase. At this point it ensures
that the end product, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
meets the requirements set forth in the President's National
Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy Document.
It also ensures that the resources needed are realistic and
can support the proposed programs and infrastructure. Prior
to the Secretary of Defense signing the DPG, draft copies are
routed to the Secretary of Defense, the various unified
command's Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) , and Type Commanders who
then have an opportunity to raise any concerns or forward
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recommendations. In this way, the services are made aware of
the strategic priorities and concerns of the Command Authority
and can begin steps to set policy toward supporting or















Figure 1.1: Planning Documents Flow. [Ref . 5: p. C-12!
At this point the DPG provides only very general fiscal
guidance. It promulgates a Total Obligational Authority
(TOA) , the maximum total amount each agency or service can use
to fund its programs for the next six years. As the end
result of this phase, the DPG is signed by the Secretary of
Defense and promulgates the necessary guidance for the
services to begin development of their programs and forms the
basis for the next phase-- programming.
2 . Programming
"In the Department of Defense, programming is the process
by which information in the Defense Planning Guidance
(developed in the planning phase) is translated into a
financial plan of effective and achievable packages
(programs)." [Ref. 6: p. C-15] Producing a six year program
every two years, the programming process starts with the last
14
four years of the previous program. The purpose of the
process is to produce the six-year Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM) . The POM is the Secretary of the Navy's
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on the best use of
the assets and resources allocated to the Department of the
Navy. It contains information about the programs, including
any planned activities, objectives and the costs associated.
Because each POM represents the middle phase, attempting
to translate strategies and policies from the planning phase
into a financial plan for programs requiring funding, it
contains loose fiscal constraints. It is still possible to
reallocate program funding within the TOA to better emphasize
programs required to meet emerging threats. When a program is
approved by the Secretary of Defense, its associated
requirements- -manpower, costs, construction plans, etc.-- are
entered into the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and
tracked for at least eight years. The FYDP is updated with
changes over the course of the budgeting cycle, so it is
possible to obtain program changes as the budgeting process
continues. To obtain this information, a Resource Allocation
Display (RAD) is printed.
The first two years of the six-year POM are used to
prepare for the final budgeting phase. From January to May of
the even POM year, the POM is refined through marks by the
Defense Resource Planning Board (DRPB) representing cuts in
funding because of insufficient justification. It is the task
of the DRPB to ensure that the budgets are realistic in terms
of the resources available. Requests without strong
justifications are marked for reductions. Reclamas to the
marks are prepared by CINCs and program sponsors to counter
the proposed reductions and promote the recommendations and
the needs of the fleet. Final decisions by the SECDEF are
forwarded via Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) and in their
final form present the requirements needed for the services'
15
budget requests. The budgeting process can then begin.
3 . Budgeting
The budgeting phase of the PPBS process assigns the
taxpayers' dollars to the programs approved in the previous
stages: planning and programming. This phase consists of two
primary steps: budget formulation and budget presentation and
review. Budget formulation is guided by the Navy Comptroller
via NAVCOMPT Notice 7111 series which provides the information
needed by Navy program sponsors to transform the POM into a
budget submission. The notice functions as a formal Budget
Call. Some of the information contained in the note is:
• Instructions and guidance for the content of the budget
estimates that are to be forwarded.
• The rates of inflation and foreign currency exchange
rates
.
• Any changes to the Department of the Navy (DON) Budget
Guidance Manual requirements.
• The submission deadlines.
The budget call compels the offices responsible for
budgeting to develop budget requests covering four years,
beginning with the fiscal year currently in progress. The
broad-based cost estimates in the POM are updated with the
latest pricing information and schedules, funding shortfalls
and problems are amended, and exhibits are attached justifying
these and any other program changes. The budget requests are
then submitted and reviewed at every level up the chain-of-
command, through the Chief of Naval Operations to the Office
of the Comptroller. A system of marks and reclamas is used to
adjust the proposals and justify an unapproved request.
When NAVCOMPT disagrees with a budget decision made by a
claimant, they will issue a mark, adjusting the budget
submission. More often than not, these are line item budget
reductions. The budget submission office of the major
16
Vclaimant responsible for the budget under review then has 48
hours to submit a reclama. The reclama should consist of new,
amplifying information supporting the original funding
amounts. The reclamas are reviewed by analysts and division
heads within NAVCOMPT and, if passed, continue to the director
of the Office of Budget and Reports. Unresolved differences
are submitted through the Chief of Naval Operations or
Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy
for final determination. [Ref. 7: p. B-52 to B-53]
As of Fiscal Year 1993, the primary responsibility for l/'l
budgeting for the Flying Hour Program rests with the Special
Assistant for the Flying Hour Program, N-889E, under the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare
Requirements and Assessments, N-8. [Ref. 8: p. 15] As
discussed in the next section, the program manager
mathematically computes the program resource requirements
using a series of formulas to find the cost per hour (CPH)
,
the number of hours required by each type/model/series (T/M/S)
aircraft and adjusts as required for inflation and program
growth or cuts. The program manager, N-889E, makes the
requested changes to the resource requirements of the Flying
Hour Program and routes the budget request to N-08 and the
Navy Comptroller, also known as N-82 or NAVCOMPT.
At this point, NAVCOMPT guides the submission of the
Navy's budget. In addition to ensuring the POMs comply with
the guidance promulgated by the DPG, it is also NAVCOMPT ' s
responsibility to ensure that the resultant programs are
justifiable and defensible before the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the Congress during the authorization and
appropriation hearings.
The SECDEF holds hearings on the service's budget
proposals with the Office of Management and Budget, which
represents the president's interest. "These hearings are used
by the SECDEF to formulate his Program Budget Decisions (PBDs)
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and Defense Management Review Decisions (DMRDs) . DMRDs seek
to achieve economies and efficiencies by management reform."
[Ref . 9: p. C-25] The PBDs are documented budget decisions by
the SECDEF with concurrence of the OMB, and are returned to
SECNAV for consideration. SECNAV then has the option of
submitting PBD reclamas, drafted by the cognizant DON
organization, in the effort to overturn a cut in funding. The
decisions by the SECDEF become final after the Major Budget
Issues meetings with the Commandant of the Marine Corps and
the Chief of Naval Operations. The SECDEF s budget is then
forwarded to the President for consideration and presentation
to Congress as a part of the national budget. The
presentation must occur by the first Tuesday in February, when
the PPBS is ended and the congressional authorization and
appropriation process begins. The congressional process ends
with a presidential ratification of the national budget . This
is ideally planned to occur by 1 October and, if completed on
time, funding is made available to the various departments and
thus to the FHP at the start of the fiscal year.
C. FUNDING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM
The FHP budget request is consolidated with the other
Navy program budgets to form the DON budget request, which is
forwarded to the SECDEF and OMB for review. In its final
j!
form, it is submitted to Congress which may require the
I comptroller and program sponsor to:
• Provide further amplifying information.
• Brief congressional staff members.
• Testify before the budgeting and armed forces
committees and/or on the floors of Congress to amplify
and justify the FHP requirements.
On a yearly basis, Congress must appropriate money to the
FHP as a part of the Navy's Operational and Maintenance
18
budget, frequently referred to as the 0&M,N appropriation.
Other appropriations affecting the FHP include the Operation
and Maintenance, Navy Reserve (0&M,NR) , Operation and
Maintenance, Marine Corps (0&M,MC) and Operational and
Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve (0&M,MCR). From these
appropriations the Navy pays for all its operational forces
and maintenance capability: ship, aircraft, Marine Corps and
Reserve. Consisting of approximately 30% of the total FY 1994
Navy budget of $77 billion, the O&M appropriations are second
only to the Military Personnel appropriation which funds the
pay, allowances, subsistence, and retirement accrual account
and totals approximately 33% of the budget.
After authorization, appropriation and ratification of
the budgets, funds are finally available to the OSD
comptroller. If completed prior to the start of the new
Fiscal Year, 1 October, funds are held until this date. If
after the start of the new FY, then continuing resolutions may
be passed by Congress to provide funds so that required
operations may continue until the formal budget is passed.
The apportionment process distributes the funds to the OSD
comptroller and hence to the Department of the Navy. Within
the DON, the funds are allocated to the various program
sponsors and the Marine Corps.
D . EXECUTION
Overall managerial responsibility for the FHP is shared
by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare
Requirements, and Assessments, or N-889E and the Navy
Comptroller, N-82. The FHP appropriations are divided into
accounts for Fuel, Organizational Maintenance Activity (OMA)
,
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) and Aviation Depot
Level Repair (AVDLR) . Then, granting obligational authority
on a quarterly basis, the funds are allocated to the major
claimants. The major claimants for the FHP are: Commander,
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U.S. Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet (CNAL) ; Commander, U.S.
Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet (CNAP) ; Commander Naval Air
Reserve Force (CNARF) ; Chief of Naval Eduction and Training
(CNET) ; and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. Since CNET
and COMUSNAVEUR are a small part of the FHP with only a
negligible impact on the FHP, they will be disregarded.
Within limits, the 0&M,N appropriation can be reallocated as
the year progresses without informing Congress. So money can
be shifted from ship steaming hours or overhaul, for example,
to fund additional flight hours or make up FHP shortfalls due
to higher costs per hour. The inherent danger exists though
that the funding process in following years will funnel less
funds to the accounts that the money is taken from, because of
the implied lack of need and priority.
At the major claimant level, funds are again allocated to
the airwings, and from there to the squadron level as an
Operational Target, or OPTAR. The Commanding Officer has the
final responsibility for maximizing aircrew and aircraft
readiness without overspending the appropriation. Each
allocation and reallocation is reported back to NAVCOMPT,
where the obligation rates are tracked. Again, budget
reallocations within the 0&M,N appropriation can be
accomplished without the concurrence of congress.
With the exception of the fourth quarter, Commanding
Officers may exceed their quarterly FHP limits up to 105% with
funding available from the wing or local comptrollers. The
excess is taken from the subsequent quarters' allocation. The
fourth quarter limit is held to 100% of the total FY
allocation, and any excess, if not fundable by sources held in
reserve at levels higher in the chain-of -command, must be
investigated and explained up the chain-of -command to the
Congress, NAVCOMPT and the Secretary of the Navy. To
determine the levels of funding to release each quarter,
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NAVCOMPT uses historical spending trends and the spending
plans submitted with the budget requests.
The FHP funding (maintenance and fuel) for the Reserve
Force Squadrons (RESFORONs) is controlled by squadron
personnel under the guidance of the comptroller at the local
Naval Air Reserve unit or Naval Air Facility. Only the
funding for fuel is controlled directly by Regular Navy
squadrons. The maintenance portion of the FHP funds- -OMA, IMA
and AVDLR--is sent to the supporting Naval Air Stations and
ships, and when maintenance is completed the costs are ordered
against the accounts.
E. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM DETERMINATION
The basic building blocks of the FHP are the number of
flight hours required by pilots and aircrew in each of the
various T/M/S aircraft in the Navy inventory and the cost per
hour to operate these aircraft. The mission environments,
types and durations vary widely between the T/M/S aircraft,
from training units to active and reserve operational shore-
based and carrier-deployed units flying search and rescue,
patrol, ground attack, air-to-air intercept, test and
evaluation flights. This mission variety complicates the
computation of aircraft cost per hour rates and has led to a
variety of methods and formulas for completing this crucial
step in budgeting for the FHP.
1. Funding the Active Duty Forces Flying Hour Program
Funding for the Navy's Flying Hour Program comes from the
Operation and Maintenance, Navy (0 and M, N) appropriation.
Revised early in 1993, effective FY 1994, the and M, N
appropriation is subdivided into four Active Duty Budget
Activities (BAs) , down from eight. Over 100 of the previous
Activity Group and Subactivity Group (AG/SAG) codes were then
simplified and assigned to one of approximately 20 AG/SAG
codes under the new BAs. Prior to FY 1994, the FHP for active
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duty forces divided the AG/SAG codes into the five BAs defined
as :
• BA-1 TACAMO.
• BA-2 Tactical Air/Anti -Submarine Warfare (TACAIR/ASW)
,
Fleet Air Training, Fleet Support.
• BA-3 Environmental Prediction (e.g., "Hurricane
Hunters" )
.
• BA-8 Pilot Training Rate (i.e., Training Commands for
initial flight training)
.
• BA-9 White House Helicopters.
Now, the BAs are subdivided into four primary activities:
(1) Operating Forces, (2) Mobilization, (3) Training and
Recruiting, and (4) Administration and Servicewide Activities
.
The AG/SAGs further subdivide the BAs (see Appendix A) ; for
instance, under the Operating Forces BA there are four AGs:
Air Operations, Ship Operations, Combat Operations/Support and
Weapons Support. The seven SAGs under the Air Operations AG
which pays for the majority of the FHP are:
• Mission and Other Flight Operations 1A1A
• Fleet Air Training 1A2A
• Intermediate Maintenance 1A3A
• Air Operations and Safety Support 1A4A
• Aircraft Depot Maintenance 1A5A
• Aircraft Depot Operations Support 1A6A
• Base Support 1A7A
In addition, there are others that impact the FHP spread
throughout the other BAs, AG/SAGs (TACAMO, for instance, is




Both the Naval Reserves and the Marine Corps use the same
BAs, AG/SAGs and funding codes as the Active Duty forces.
However, as in the case of the Operation and Maintenance, Navy-
Reserve appropriation which uses BA-1 Operating Forces and BA-
4 Administration and Servicewide activities, only a limited
number are applicable (again, see Appendix A for the complete
breakdown)
.
The formal process for computing the required funding for
the active duty TACAIR/ASW units used by N-889E is much more
involved than the procedures used by the Naval Air Reserve for
similar reserve aircraft. The process is defined by six
formulas
:
1. (Primary Authorized Aircraft (PAA) per unit) X (Crew
Seat Ratio) = Number of Allowed Crews per Squadron
2. (Allowed Crews) X (Aircrew Manning Factors) = Budgeted
Crews per Squadron
3. (Budgeted Crews) X (Required Hrs per Crew per Month)
X (12 Months) = Required Annual Flying Hours per Squadron
4. (Req Annual Flying Hrs per Squadron) X (Number of
Squadrons) = Total Annual Flying Hours Required
5. (Total Annual Flying Hrs Required) X (Primary Mission
Readiness Percentage) = Annual Budgeted Flying Hours
6. (Annual Budgeted Hrs) X (Cost per Hour) = Annual
Budgeted Cost
In essence the number of crews, aircraft and desired Primary
Mission Readiness rate determine the budgeted costs. The
number of aircraft assigned to a unit (PAA) and the number of
crews assigned to operate them for full combat readiness is
set by the program sponsor, N-88. The Primary Mission
Readiness (PMR) rates are percentages of flight hours required
to maintain full combat readiness by the aircrews on a monthly
basis. The PMR rates and the percentage of simulator time are
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frequently adjusted by NAVCOMPT to obtain savings in the FHP.
The historical rates [Ref. 10] have been set at:
• FY 1990: 87% PMR (including 2% for funding flight
simulators)
• FY 1991: 87% PMR (including 2% for funding flight
simulators)
• FY 1992: 85% PMR (including 2% for funding flight
simulators)
• FY 1993: 85% PMR (including 2% for funding flight
simulators)
• FY 1994: 88.7% PMR (including 2% for funding flight
simulators)
• FY 1995: 86.7% PMR (Projected PMR: using this figure
results in a predicted $31 million shortfall in the
FHP 3 )
The PMR rate serves to enforce conservation measures and
complicates management of resource dollars by the end user at
the squadron level. Fewer funded flying hours do not change
the minimum required pilot and aircrew hours for maximum
combat readiness as set forth in training and readiness
manuals and matrices. Imaginative techniques for cutting
costs- -fuel and maintenance- -may be required to meet
operational requirements and maximize training opportunities.
No squadron Commanding Officer wants to overspend the FHP
accounts. Concurrently, however, squadron funding,
3 The shortfall results from a lower amount of funding
provided by the Op- 20 (the document from NAVCOMPT defining
program resource levels) than that required to maintain the
stated PMR for TACAIR. Not all aircraft are funded on PMR,
logistic aircraft budgets, for instance, are driven by
utilization rates. If more funding is not forthcoming, then
money can be redirected from logistic squadrons (lowering
their availability for tasking, but not yet impacting flight
safety or readiness) to the TACAIR units which are at the
margin for pilot flight safety and readiness (approximately
135-140 hours per pilot per year)
.
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maintenance, operations and training managers are not
motivated under the current system to obtain any net cost
savings
.
It is frequently implied by higher operational authority
that the failure to obligate allocated funds by 30 September
will result in commensurate cutbacks in funds the next year.
At every level of the chain-of -command, the assumption is made
that unspent funding indicates an excess of resources required
to do the assigned missions, so the excess is channeled to
other units demonstrating the need and management ability to
use 100% of the assigned funds. To maximize resource
utilization, units aggressively manage remaining funding,
resulting in a frequent "twelfth hour" surge in "training"
flights, aircraft sitting on the ramp with the maximum
allowable fuel loads, and maintenance purchases of high-dollar
consumable parts, like windshields. The perception that funds
have to be obligated or will be lost in the next budget cycle
has led to a "use it or lose it" mentality in times of
relative plenty and was a major impediment to the efficient
and effective utilization of resources assigned to the Navy's
Flying Hour Program and may have distorted the need for funds
in the follow-on budgeting process.
2 . Funding the Naval Air Reserve Flying Hour Program
The Reserve forces use the simplest computations based on
the number of flight billets assigned to find the number of
flight hours and, therefore, the amount of funding required
for safety and readiness. Although based on the same factors
as the active duty formulas, the reserve formula is easily
stated:
(Fit Billets) X (150 Hrs required) X (Primary Mission
Readiness rate - 2.5% for simulator usage) = Annual Unit Pilot
Flight Hours required.
Flight currency requirements are considered less critical
for the aircrew, so the required number of annual flight hours
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for Naval Flight Officers and aircrew are lower. Historically,
the aircrew have been able to obtain their hours for currency
and maintain their readiness requirements within the pilot
flight hour funding constraints. Therefore, the aircrew
flight hour requirements are not considered when budgeting and
assigning flight hours to the squadrons. [Ref . 11]
There are some inconsistencies inherent in using these
formulas. The formulas consider some flight billets which may
not be filled, while in other flight billets, the pilots and
aircrew are at different stages of training and capability.
There may be a senior pilot who requires five to ten hours a
month in different operational mission areas to remain combat
ready, and another more inexperienced pilot may require
extensive training in the rudiments of the aircraft and combat
systems amounting to 10 to 20 flight hours per month or more.
Of course, these formulas also do not consider the
differences in aircraft and missions in assigning flight time.
This task is the responsibility of the individual comptrollers
at the stations and supporting units. Frequently responsible
for multiple squadrons of dissimilar aircraft, the supporting
comptrollers are able to shift FHP funding between the
squadrons. The only restrictions are that they must report
the changes, and the changes cannot be so severe as to cause
the 'donating' squadron to be unable to fly the assigned
flight hours or meet commitments.
3. Funding Naval Air System Command Units
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) consists of
major air test facilities and squadrons. These units are
tasked with conducting applied aircraft and missile research,
development, and testing for the Navy, Navy contractors, or
non-Department of Defense customers. The Pacific Missile Test
Center (PMTC) at Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California, as
a NAVAIRSYSCOM activity supports Naval Air Reserve units and
flies Navy aircraft without funding from Commander, Naval Air
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Forces, Pacific. PMTC is funded through the Defense Business
Operating Fund, and to a lesser extent NAVAIRSYSCOM. Although
this funding arrangement is not true for all NAVAIRSYSCOM
units, PMTC ' s funding is of particular interest because of the
manner in which the cost of operating its aircraft is
predicted.
The Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) is a working
capital, revolving fund. Activities within the fund conduct
business (accepting work orders or flying missions as in the
case of PMTC) by drawing funds from the DBOF corpus. Standard
cost rates for overhead and flight activity have been
computed, and the customer is billed according to the use of
the activity. The DBOF is then repaid, hence the title:
revolving fund. The revolving fund was established on 1
October 1991 (FY 1992) , and is intended to operate on a
breakeven basis. This requires the DBOF activities to charge
their customers an equal amount as their total costs- -full
cost recovery. Customers reimburse DBOF activities their
direct and a portion of the indirect costs from their
appropriated funding accounts. The data in Table 2.1 show
PMTC rates for using their F/A-18s. It should be noted that
NAVAIRSYSCOM maintained responsibility for the Aviation Depot
j
Level Repairable (AVDLR) costs, and paid them with
appropriated funding. Therefore, these were not used in the
rates and are not shown.
Prior to the start of a new fiscal year, the Director of
Operations teams with personnel from the Comptroller
Department to attempt to predict the total costs and estimate
the flight hour, or fly, rates for the coming year. The fly
rates are based on known, ongoing project aircraft utilization
requirements, with a factor for unknown emerging requirements.
The fly rates are computed for each of the 14 T/M/S aircraft
flown by Navy pilots and aircrew at PMTC. In addition, the
flight crew must maintain flight currency requirements so,
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based on flight billets assigned, additional time may be
considered.
V
Cost Category- F/A-18A F/A-18B F/A-18C
Civilian Labor $158,635 $143,325 $157,387
Civilian Travel $636 $3,173 $5,395




Gnd Sup Equip $9,649 $48, 175 $81, 900
Level 2 Costs $5, 098 $25,455 $43,274
Contracts $150, 940 $150, 940 $150, 940
Misc $14, 170 $70, 747 $120,274
Total Costs $751, 066 $683,650 $903,782
Reg Fit Rate $4,397 $4,397 $4,397
Reg Income $146, 860 $776, 950 $1,432,103
PMCF Rate $1,673 $1, 673 $1,673
PMCF Income $12,715 $46, 844 $37,308
Test Income $17,750 $0 $0
Total Income $181,325 $839,794 $1, 531,411
Variance $ (569,742) $156, 144 $627,629
Table 2.1: PMTC FY 1993 F/A-18 Cost/Income Totals. [Ref .12]
Total costs for each aircraft, based on historical data
and inflation rates, are then applied to find the projected
hourly rates charged for the use of each aircraft (Reg Fit
Rate). These rates are also shown in Table 2.1. The costs
that vary with the amount of flight hours consists of the
charges for consumables and some maintenance actions. This
usually totals to a little over half the total operational and
support costs. Other costs do not vary with flight hours,
these costs consist mostly of charges for overhead. PMTC will
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then compute and use a slightly lower rate for charging the
Navy for aircraft tasked for flight proficiency training and
maintenance, since these tasks do not incur project overhead
(minimal civilian labor costs, etc.) . These rates are listed
in Table 2.1 under the PMCF (Post Maintenance Check Flight)
Rate.
Level 2 costs, listed in Table 2.1, are those costs
charged for ordnance, flight safety, and flight clothing. In
essence, this category covers costs directly related to flying
the missions.
The principles of the working capital and revolving fund
concept requires charging customers- -DOD and non-DOD
activities- -for the use of PMTC ' s services. Defining its
services in terms of the number of hours of aircraft flight
time required generates a few problems. Although PMTC
personnel have proved to be fairly accurate in predicting the
fly rates and costs, government downsizing and project
cutbacks are a concern for the PMTC staff. As customer's
shrink and the demand for PMTC ' s services diminish, the
invariant costs, or overhead, become a larger part of the
rates charged to the remaining customers. Higher costs
concern customers, causing them to shrink demand further, and
a vicious cycle develops. Customers and potential customers
find alternate ways for conducting research, development, and
testing, and the ability to provide services diminishes with
the loss in funding. The purpose of DBOF--to use commercial
techniques for efficiency and effectiveness- -results in the
loss of capability due to high per flight hour costs and loss
of the required customer base.
The most important aspect of funding flight hours at
PMTC, Point Mugu is the ability of the program managers and
budgeteers to predict the annual costs and, based on projected




In this chapter, an overview of the Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System was provided. The products, reviewers
and decision makers that participate in the complicated, years
long process for budgeting the defense of the United States
were identified. After the priorities have been set and the
funds approved, allocated and apportioned, it is the
responsibility of the Navy leadership to manage the funds in
compliance with the goals identified to obtain them. The
failure to manage these funds properly may lead to, at best,
unfunded programs in the next budget cycle and, at worst, the
failure of strategic policy to prevent war and/or poor
tactical performance in time of war, leading to unnecessary
deaths and destruction.
Three methods of predicting Flight Hour Program
requirements used by three major claimants flying the F/A-18
were presented. Each used a different base and methodology to
define the costs incurred, and each had different advantages,
incentives, and drawbacks.
Chapter III will thoroughly define the process and
methodologies used by budget managers at Commander Naval Air
Reserve Force to predict the total costs and compute their
budget input, the variances and baseline assumptions for the
F/A-18. The methodology of regression analysis which is the
technique proposed for modeling the costs per hour used in the
FHP process is explained.
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III. COST ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATING
A. INTRODUCTION
The techniques used for estimating hardware
cost range from intuition at one extreme to a
detailed application of labor and material cost
standards at the other. One military service
manual on cost estimating lists five basic methods:
industrial engineering standards; rates, factors,
and catalog prices; estimating relationships;
specific analogies; and expert opinion. Other
sources put the number at two (synthesis and
analysis) , three (roundtable estimating, estimating
by comparison, and detailed estimating) , or four
(analytical appraisal, comparative analysis,
statistical analysis, and use of standards) . [Ref
.
13: p. 1-7]
There are a number of different methods for analyzing
data and estimating costs in the budgeting environment. The
three most common methodologies are: analogy, grass roots or
engineering, and parametric. [Ref. 14: p 15] Each has its own
advantages and disadvantages, and depending on the
environment, any of the three may be the most appropriate for
obtaining the goals of the analysis. Although the parametric
technique using regression analysis is the primary analysis
tool used in the next chapter, this chapter will define each
of the methodologies in terms of the Flight Hour Program (FHP)
environment and Reserve F/A-18 budgeting.
B. METHODOLOGIES
The use of any one of the three techniques (analogy,
engineering and parametric) is dependent upon the limitations
of the database, the underlying assumptions needed to simplify
the analysis, and the goals of the analyst. Consistent with
a given situation, the various techniques may accentuate one
or more aspects of the relationship (s) within the data under
analysis. The purpose of the analysis should be to ascertain
as accurately as possible the cause and effect being analyzed
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and model it as completely as possible without distorting that
relationship. In this manner, consistently accurate
predictions can be extrapolated. Therefore, using imprecise
assumptions or a suboptimal technique may highlight only one
particular facet of the relationship being analyzed and lead
to errors in the subsequent prediction process.
All three methods are based on tools and techniques that
are able to identify and define cost estimating relationships,
or CERs . These CERs are a result of identifying the cause and
effect of one or more facets that affect the cost and are the
keys to accurate cost estimation. In his study of the Air
Force's depot level maintenance cost allocation, Captain Bruce
M. Kalish, USAF, noted:
In the past, characteristics such as weight
and thrust have been used to estimate aircraft
airframe and engine costs, respectively. However
cost estimators have continuously searched for
other aircraft characteristics that (1) will
provide consistently accurate estimates, (2) are
logically related to cost, and (3) can easily be
determined prior to actual design and development,
thus allowing for trade-offs between cost and
physical/performance characteristics. [Ref. 15: p
16]
The same principles apply after fielding a weapon system.
Once the cost estimators are identified and if their
relationships can be accurately determined, the same cost
characteristics that were used prior to weapon system
development may be used to predict the effect on costs after
deployment of the system. Of course, after a data base of
actual experience in the field has been built, then costs may
be predicted using observed CERs. In any case, the data base
may be analyzed by any of the following methods.
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1. The Analogy Method
For the purpose of estimating costs, the analogy method
uses the historical records of an analogous system with like
characteristics to model and estimate the costs of the system
or relationships under analysis. This method is dependent
upon the assumptions that:
• Actual future costs will be affected to an equal degree
by the degree by the analogous relationships used for
the analysis.
• Any differences requiring adjustments can be identified
and accurately quantified.
• The experience of the analyst is sufficient to identify
differences in causal relationships and the magnitude
of their effects. [Ref. 16: p 17]
This method is most appropriate when an analogous system
with similar relationships exists and its data is readily
available to the analyst. The method is often used to provide
supportable, though usually "ballpark," information when time
is a limiting factor or when the data for the desired
relationship is unavailable.
The primary disadvantage of this method is that the costs
are based on the characteristics and history of the analogous
item. The causal relationships and effects on cost are not
directly related to the performance of the item under
analysis, rather they are hypothesized to be the same as in
the past and the same as experienced by the parallel item.
The entire method also depends upon the knowledge and
judgement of the analyst and an ability to accurately identify
the parallels, the differences and the magnitude of their
effects on the analysis. Finally, the accuracy and effect of
any adjustments must be carefully considered.
For budgeting, many cost analysts will use earlier,
analogous systems to model the programs under analysis. In
the case of the F/A-18 for instance, the cost functions of the
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aircraft it replaced, the A-7, may be used as a starting place
for analysis. The same techniques and cost factors can be
assumed to affect the cost of the F/A-18 as its predecessor
because it works in the same environment. Adjustments must
then be made for the improvements in reliability and
maintainability. This type of data is frequently available
from component testing conducted prior to fielding the system.
Because actual data concerning the field performance and cost
is not available, the method is a viable alternative. Actual
performance and cost may then reveal unforeseen relationships
and (frequently) elevated costs, which may then be
incorporated into follow-on analyses.
2 . The Grass Roots or Engineering Method
This method is based on an extensive knowledge of all the
component costs and relationships affecting the total or final
system cost. This method relies exclusively on definitive
knowledge of all factors affecting cost, their relationships
and magnitudes. It is built on the assumption that future
data relationships and their effect on cost are predictable
and quantifiable from historical data on the components. With
complete knowledge of each sub-component's reaction and
effect, all the predicted causal factors can be extrapolated
and summed for a net result
.
The results of this method vary directly with the degree
and accuracy of the analyst's knowledge of the system, its
relationships, causes and effects. With extensive, well-
behaved data, this method is usually preferred over the
others. The theory underlying this method causes it to be
inherently very precise, however the real -world drawbacks of
the method account for its shortcomings. The extent of
knowledge and amount of data required for this method of cost
analysis is tremendously time consuming and usually not
feasible or available. Any unquantif iable ambiguities and
inconsistences account for significant errors.
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The engineering method accounts, in part, for the
extensive component testing required for new weapon systems.
With extensive aircraft component performance data,
maintenance costs and fuel usage can be predicted and properly-
anticipated. Relying on this form of information for
predicting F/A-18 budget requirements led, in part, to the FHP
budgeting problems experienced in FY 1994. Components of the
new F/A-18 General Electric F-404 engines required maintenance
more often than predicted (see Table 3.1) . The Aviation
Support Office (ASO) was prompted to cut in half the time
required between conducting major overhauls of the F/A-18
COMNAVAIRESFOR






Stage 1 5850 V;< 2200 62.3%
Stage 2 8770 3100 64.6%
Stage 3 4380 1700 61.1%
Aft Shaft 9030 4600 49.0%
II. HIGH PRESSURE COMPRESSOR
Stage 1-2 2240 1700 33.0%
Stage 3 7480 3470 53.6%
Stage 4-7 14560 12500 14.1%
HPC FWD Shaft 4980 4000 19.6%
III. HIGH PRESSURE TURBINE
Disc 10500 7200 31.4%
Fwd Cooling Plate 2100 1600 23.8%
IV. LOW PRESSURE TURBINE
Disc 10520 6240 40.6%
Fwd Air Seal 22030 18000 18.2%
Conical Shaft 12370 6700 45.8%
Table 3.1: F/A-18 Engine Component Life Reductions [Ref
17]
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F-404 engines. Since the engines are being pulled and
replaced twice as often as anticipated from testing, the
actual cost has approximately doubled. [Ref. 18] The
budgetary shortfalls are a direct result of these unforeseen
reliability changes. It may be argued that more extensive
component testing of the engines may have identified the
problems now being experienced. With prior knowledge, the
budgets would have reflected the increased funding
requirements and the present shortfalls would not exist, or at
least would be much less severe.
3 . Parametric Methods
This method uses mathematical techniques to manipulate
historical data and define a formula to be used for
prediction. Parametric methods, such as regression analysis,
seek to define in mathematical terms all or part of the cause-
and-effect relationships between two or more characteristics.
Over the range defined by the data used to construct the
mathematical formula, regression analysis can model the net of
the relationship (s) between the variables, or any of the
component parts. By limiting the relationships and a given
range of data and using simplifying assumptions for the
analysis, a system component cost can be identified.
Conversely, the net result of the relationships affecting the
entire system can be treated as one and, if consistent over
the range being studied, accurate predictions obtained. The
predictions will be dependent upon the given system and
limiting assumptions; change either and the results will
probably differ.
Parametric methods depend on consistency of the
relationships and data over time. Any changes in the
fundamental relationships within the data range or over time
must be recognized by the analyst and the effect estimated
using one of the other two techniques. With further
documentation or data, the effect can be included in or
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excluded from the original mathematical definition. If
quantifying the effect is not possible, then the only other
alternative is constraining the analysis in a manner to rule
out the effect.
When analyzing the costs of operating F/A-18s, intuition
suggests that the costs should be dependent upon the level of
operations. That is, above a given threshold, the costs of
operation should react to an increase or decrease in flight
hours. For instance, fuel usage should increase with the
number of flight hours flown, although below a certain level
they will tend to level off due to a fairly constant ground
consumption rate for maintenance purposes. For a squadron
with its aircraft in preservation the usage should be nearly
zero. Like fuel, the cost of maintaining the aircraft should
increase as the number of flight hours increase. It would
also seem logical that points should exist above and below
which the maintenance costs would tend to level off. Above
the upper bound, costs would tend to level off as an increase
in flight hours would have little effect through additional
maintenance required when compared to the level already
required. Likewise a lower bound should exist, below which
maintenance would still be required despite a further
reduction in flight hours. Between these points, parametric
assumptions and methods, such as regression analysis, should
be able to accurately model the relationships of fuel and
maintenance costs to the number of hours flown.
C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE FHP
Because parametric methods seek to define the cause and
effect relationship between two or more variables, one output
variable must be linked, or in some way be dependent, upon the
other, independent, variable. Regression analysis then uses
multiple data points, assumes a stable, definable trend, and
fits the data to a mathematical expression of the "typical"
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cause and effect relationship. The independent variable is
expected to vary over time and over an acceptable range for
analysis. The dependent variable is expected to vary in a
definable, consistent manner in concert with the independent
variable
.
When the dependent variable varies in a manner unexpected
with the change in the independent variable, the result is a
data point termed an outlier. The outlier may be one of two
types: one inconsequential to the analysis, the other critical
to accurate prediction. The first is a true anomaly caused by
unpredictable influences and unlikely to occur again in the
future. Once this type of outlier is identified, it should be
removed from the data set. Deleting its influence from the
relationship may further refine the assumptions upon which the
results are based. Therefore, the analyst should exercise
extreme care in modifying a data base.
The second type of outlier indicates a problem in the
analysis. That is, there are recurring influences, or
relationships, that have not been considered which have a
demonstrable effect on the desired outcomes. If the influence
of the affected data cannot be compensated for or quantified,
then the assumptions or data range must be adjusted to exclude
the reflected relationship.
One of the most important steps in analyzing a budgeting
data base and estimating relationships is understanding and
refining the data forming the basis of the relationship.
Relatively minor flaws or inconsistencies in the data base can
result in significant errors in the output. For this reason,
the raw data must typically be purged of inconsequential
outliers and adjusted for assumptions, format, time and range.
1. Assumptions. When using regression analysis for
constructing a F/A-18 cost model, the basic assumption is that
there is a direct relationship between maintenance and fuel
costs and the flight hours flown. For the purposes of this
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thesis, a critical corollary assumption is that this
relationship will be linear over the range to be analyzed.
This assumption greatly simplifies the model. Of course,
unexpected variances in the results of the analysis can be
traced back to these assumptions if they are erroneous and the
relationships are, in fact, curvilinear. Any factors
potentially affecting these assumptions must be considered and
integrated into or removed from the data set.
Methods presently in use by Active and Reserve components
for F/A-18 budgeting assume that fly rates and costs, adjusted
for inflation, will be essentially the same as those during
the past three years. To find the proposed budget submission,
costs for the last three years are adjusted by the promulgated
inflation indices and averaged together to obtain the new
budgeting base. Generally, this method would suffice if costs
and flight hours are driven by a consistent operational tempo.
The last three years, however, have not been conducive to this
procedure. Desert Storm operations and cost increases have
skewed the averages. The Defense Business Operating Fund has
been operating at a loss and so boosted the costs it charges
to its customers. As already noted, F/A-18 F-404 engine life
has been drastically cut, also increasing costs. The
combination of these budgeting inconsistencies have prompted
drastic measures.
To budget for FY 1995, the three year average normally
used for budgeting was temporarily discarded in favor of using
actual data for the five most expensive aircraft in the
inventory. [Ref. 19] Although FY 1994 was a period
characterized by the grounding of entire squadrons for lack of
flight funds, with their aircraft placed in preservation to
minimize maintenance costs, data was collected on the five
most expensive aircraft types to adjust the budgeting base.
The aircraft used were: F-14, F/A-18, AV-8, H-53 and the EA-
6B. Many feel that opting for actual data during a period of
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fiscal constraint, though better than the three year average,
would still result in conservative estimates of cost. On the
positive side, budgeting in this manner should be improved by
the tie to the actual increased costs for these aircraft,
should reflect the increased usage caused by a shrinking
fleet, and capture the higher surcharges for depot
maintenance. In this manner, the change will regain the
current budget shortfalls.
2. Format. To insure a model using regression analysis
successfully captures the relationship between costs and
flight hours, the data base must be in a useable format,
generally without extraneous computations or data. In this
way, the fluctuations in flight operations between deployment
and standdown and the effect on cost can be readily observed.
This will also enable detection of leads or lags, if costs lag
the operational tempo for instance. • Of course layout is a
part of format and is critical to the success of any analysis.
As an example, data consisting of differing units can obscure
any relationship.
3. Time. All relationships tend to change over time and
this is true for cost relationships as well. Budgeteers
already consider the effect of time by adjusting data for
inflation. By treating each year as the year before when
computing the three year average, however, major events
affecting cost are ignored. As was experienced in budgeting
for FY 1995, the base will soon be unacceptably out of bounds
with reality, and drastic steps must be taken to catch up.
4. Range. As was previously illustrated, when data
nears the extremes of its range, the relationship tends to
distort. When analyzing a straight line relationship, it is
usually best to be working with a steady-state system. Other
models based on historical occurrences will frequently model
fluid relationships better. For instance budget managers will
frequently use historical costs to fund squadrons
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transitioning between aircraft types. This situation
frequently results in a long period of initial qualification,
intense pilot training and high aircraft maintenance rates.
A lower than normal number of flight hours and higher
maintenance costs are reflected in the data. Depending on the
assumptions, to base out -year budgets on a fluid transition
period will distort requirements. If a squadron will always
be in transition, then its effect can be programmed into the
model. However, this will rarely be the case as fewer new
Type/Model/Series aircraft are projected to be entering the
fleet. In the instance that a squadron is transitioning, the
information from previous units having already completed the
transition process can be applied to adjust the model as
required.
5. Sample Size. To build a regression analysis model
with insufficient data may result in a mathematical equation
that fails to adequately represent the extent of the
relationships it is attempting to quantify. Other techniques,
such as graphing, a "rule of thumb, " or simply the analysts
judgement, could be just as accurate and justified as well.
The extent of the model, its assumptions and ultimate goals,
should determine the sample size and whether or not there is
enough data for the analysis.
Regression analysis is based on defining the relationship
between a dependent variable and one or more independent
variables. Since fuel consumption is assumed to increase with
the number of hours flown for instance, then the independent
variable described by flight hours has a dependent variable,
fuel. These two variables are linked by a function that
describes their relationship. Regression analysis methods
attempt to evaluate that function. But the fuel consumption
may also depend on other independent variables, engine
efficiencies or ambient air temperature and pressure for
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instance, and it is these other variables that contribute to
variance in the model.
In contrast to the variables are constants. Constants
remain the same regardless of variation in their environment.
Systemized maintenance that is required on the basis of time,
completely independent of utilization, weather, or any other
condition, is an example of a constant. The cost of this type
of maintenance may affect the magnitude of total costs, but
will not affect the model. Because constants do not vary,
regression analysis, or any other mathematical techniques, is
not required to predict their future value.
To mathematically determine a straight line for the data
pairs representing the dependent and independent variables,
the method of least squares- -best fit is used. This method
uses all the data pairs not already ruled out as anomalous
outliers. The data is weighted equally. That is, no pair is
assumed to be more accurate than any other. Then a line is
fitted that mathematically minimizes the differences between
all the observed dependent values to their mathematical
equivalent denoted by the line, the dependent value of the
data pairs (the Y value) described by the equation. This
method also assumes that the actual, observed data
relationships will consistently vary within the analyzed
range. That is, the actual data will always tend to minimize
any differences from the typical value described by the fitted
line. Therefore, the distribution will be normally
distributed about the line, which is to say that the farther
a point is from the line the less likely the observed point
will occur. The equations and theory describing the
regression method are based in calculus, however, the
mathematical techniques used in actually performing regression
analysis are found in simple algebra.
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D. SUMMARY
This chapter has described three methodologies used for
mathematically describing the relationship between two
variables such as cost and performance. These are the
analogous, the grass roots or engineering, and the parametric
methods. The specific advantages and disadvantages of each in
evaluating the function describing flight hours and its
relationship to fuel and maintenance costs were explored. In
times of restricted funding, it is imperative that military-
budget managers have realistic models describing program costs
and performance. Realistic cost estimates and predictions can
be the difference between obtaining the funding needed for
flight safety and readiness and aircraft languishing on the
ramps in preservation.
Some of the nuances of the parametric method used in this
thesis, regression analysis, as well as the other two methods
(the analogous and grass roots or engineering method) and
their effect in analyzing budgeting problems, were thoroughly
reviewed. The importance of a stable relationship within the
analyzed range, adjusted for time, in a usable format and with
adequate sample size to provide a meaningful result was
emphasized.
Finally the basic theory of regression analysis and the
least squares- -best fit technique were reviewed. The idea of
a function describing the relationship between two variables-
-
one dependent upon and reacting to the other- -was proposed for
use to relate flight hours to the dependent variables of fuel
and maintenance costs.
In the next chapter, the data base provided by Commander
Naval Air Reserve Force is described. The assumptions and
cost requirements unique to the F/A-18 data provided are
discussed and the data translated into a usable format. The
specific compensations made for various influences and those
that could not be identified or quantified are delineated.
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IV. F/A-18 FLIGHT HOUR AND COST DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the reader to the information
provided by Commander Naval Air Reserve Force that forms the
database for the analysis. There are various influences and
many data characteristics potentially affecting the outcomes
of the data analysis. Therefore, the database requires a
number of mathematical adjustments to facilitate the use of
regression analysis techniques and ensure usable, definitive
results. Each section is devoted to the discussion of a
single cost pool and the various influences, potential sources
of error, and any methods used for compensation. The final
section is a chapter summary.
B. THE DATA FROM COMNAVAIRESFOR
The data used in this thesis has been compiled by
COMNAVAIRESFOR on reserve units flying the McDonnell Douglas
F/A-18 for the Fiscal Years (FY) of 1991, 1992, 1993, and
1994. COMNAVAIRESFOR receives information on the Naval
Reserve F/A-18 units from a required Memo Record Flight Hour
Cost Report (Rpt Sym 7310-7) , which is to be submitted by the
tenth of a given month for the previous month. The report is
prepared by the various station comptrollers for the squadrons
they support and is sent via message format. The format for
the report is provided as Appendix B. The Marine Corps
Reserve F/A-18 units send their information via the Marine
Corps Reserve headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana.
COMNAVAIRESFOR tracks the monthly flight hours and cost
data by squadron in a Lotus database. It is then used as a
basis for the monthly Memo Flying Hour Costs Report which
documents the Cost Per Hour (CPH) and flight hours flown by
every Naval and Marine Corps Reserve squadron. To maintain
compatibility and enhance the usefulness of this thesis and
its findings, the data provided by COMNAVAIRESFOR was compiled
45
in a Lotus database, adjustments made as necessary, and
analyzed using the regression analysis outputs provided by
that software package.
Although monthly totals are reported by each unit,
COMNAVAIRESFOR uses the information in a cumulative form based
on Fiscal Year (FY) . To obtain the cumulative flight hour
numbers, the month's reported data is added to the previous
months' to obtain the running total for the current fiscal
year. Each month's Cost Per Hour (CPH) is then computed by
dividing the total costs in each category by the total hours
flown. The resulting numbers are cumulative, year-to-date
figures. At the end of the fiscal year (FY), the results
yield the CPH average and the total flight hours flown for the
entire Fiscal Year. These totals are then easily compared to
any estimates or maximum limits predicted at the start of the
FY. 1 On 1 October with the new FY, the counters are reset to
zero and the computations begin anew for the new FY funding.
This analysis, to be consistent with the methods of and tools
available to COMNAVAIRESFOR, uses the cumulative FY data.
The Memo Record Flight Hour Cost Report information
tracked by COMNAVAIRESFOR that form the basis of the analysis
effort are:
• The number of flight hours flown by each unit
• The total fuel costs for each unit
• The total Organizational Maintenance Activity (OMA)
costs for each unit.
• The total Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) costs
for each unit
.
xFor instance, at the beginning of the year, budgeters
may project a maximum flight hour rate per squadron based on
the number of pilots needing training in each unit. This will
drive the disbursement of FHP funding. At the end of the
year, the actual dollars spent and hours flown can be used to
determine unit efficiencies.
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• The total Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) costs
for each unit
.
The number of flight hours represent the level of activity for
each squadron and, it is assumed, is a significant driver in
the magnitude of the other four types of data: the costs. The
costs, then, are hypothesized to depend upon the flight hours.
As the number of flight hours increase, there should be a
definable reaction in the four costs- -Fuel, OMA, IMA, AVDLR-
-
that will cause them to behave in a predictable manner. As
stated in Chapter I, the goal of this thesis is to identify,
validate and quantify these relationships and build a model
capable of predicting future cost behavior.
Intuitively, the level of activity is only one of the
influences potentially affecting cost over time. When working
with costs over a period of years, inflation must be
considered. To accurately compare cost data from different
years, it must be mathematically adjusted to represent
monetary values measured at a single base year. The averaged
inflation effect on cost can be reliably determined. The Navy
Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) publishes an annual notice,
NAVCOMPTNOTE 7111 [Ref. 20], containing its determination of
the inflation rates as they affect the various Navy, Marine,
Active and Reserve appropriations. The stated purpose of the
notice is to disseminate this information and provide formats
for use in budget preparation and submission. For the
purposes of this thesis, all costs are in terms of Fiscal Year
1991 dollars. That is, all the cost figures have been
deflated to their FY 1991 equivalent for comparison purposes.
The NAVCOMPT 7111 Notice also addresses the topic of fuel
contracts. It provides the negotiated cost for all aviation
fuels pumped into naval aviation aircraft at stateside bases.
The fuel prices are given for JP-4, JP-5, JP-8 (JP represents
jet propellant) and AVGAS (for aviation piston engines) in
terms of cost per barrel. By using these contract prices, the
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cost for fuel can be adjusted to a base year amount, Fiscal
Year 1991 costs.
COMNAVAIRESFOR provided information on ten Navy and
Marine Corps reserve squadrons flying the McDonnell Douglas
F/A-18 Hornet. The squadrons are listed with their transition
dates in Figure 4-1. The transition dates indicate the month
and year that the squadrons began flying the F/A-18 and
reporting the costs. Usually there is a transition period, of
varying length, during which the unit is responsible for
flying and maintaining the old and the new aircraft. This
period will affect the analysis for those units. Not noted in
Figure 4-1, two of the squadrons, the "Golden Hawks" of VFA-
303 and the "Lobos" of VFA-305, were disestablished in July
and August of 1994, respectively, as a part of the pending
disestablishment of Reserve Carrier Air Wing 30 in September
of 1994.
Flight hour and cost information from these ten units
during the years of FY 1991 through FY 1994 form the data base
for this research. But a number of assumptions are required
if the information from these ten units is to be used for
comparison purposes:
• Primary Mission Area--the differences in mission
Unit: Location: Transition:
MAG-41 Dallas, TX October 1993
MAG-42A Jacksonville,: : :FL:;: ; June 1991
MAG-46 San Diego, CA June 1989
MAG-4 9A Washington, D.C^x January 1992
VFA-2 03 Jacksonville, FLx : September 1991
VFA-2 04 New Orleans, LA March 1991
VFA-3 03 NAS Lemoore, CA July 1984
VFA-3 05 Point Mugu, CA February I987x::
VFC-12 Norfolk, VA June 1993
VFC-13 :x:S;ailx Diego, CA July 1993
Figure 4-1: Reserve Units Flying the F/A-18, Location, and
Transition Date.
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between the VFC and VFA Navy units and the Marine units
do not affect maintenance and fuel costs.
• Deployments- -the unit deployments and detached
operations do not affect costs differently. The costs
are either consistent with the higher deployment levels
of flight operations or the units each deploy
approximately equally.
• Home sites- -the AVDLR stockage procedures and fuel
costs are the same at the various F/A-18 bases across
the country.
• Aircraft- -either the number of aircraft in each
squadron is the same or no squadron has a cost
advantage by supporting either more or fewer aircraft
while flying the same flight hour program.
• Year-end Goal--the drive to expend 100% of assigned
funds while flying 100% of assigned flight hours by 30




Included in Appendix C are the reported flight hours and
fuel costs for the ten squadrons flying F/A-18s in the
COMNAVAIRESFOR claimancy. Appendix C represents the
COMNAVAIRESFOR modified data provided by the units, that is,
it is in its cumulative form. To use the fuel costs for
comparison purposes, they must first be adjusted for the
changes in the fuel contract and inflation. As promulgated by
the NAVCOMPT Notice 7111, the contracted fuel prices for FY
1991 through FY 1994 are as noted in Figure 4-2. The notice
also provides the price escalation indices for fuel as shown
in the figure.
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Year: Fuel Cost: Index :
FY 1991 $44.52 per barrel 100.00%
FY 1992 $29.82 per barrel 85.20%
FY 1993 $31.50 per barrel 93.38%
FY 1994 $35 . 70 per barrel 98.05%
Figure 4-2: Annual Fuel Cost and Price Escalation Indices
As can be seen in Figure 4-2, FY 1991 is used as the base
year and is therefore assigned an index of 100% (or 1) . The
following year the cost for fuel dropped dramatically and then
began a steady rise in price through FY 1994. Each succeeding
index has been computed by NAVCOMPT considering the change in
contract price rise and the effect of inflation, so that fuel
costs in the follow-on years can be expressed in terms of FY
1991 dollars. To put the costs in term of FY 1991 dollars,
the cost of the fuel in a follow-on year is divided by the
index for the year in which it was purchased.
Based on the assumptions stated earlier in this chapter,
there are no adjustments to be made to flight hours for fuel
cost analysis. Though the F/A-18 F-404 engines have varying
consumption rates at the various altitudes, aircraft
configurations and power settings required for different
flight regimes, it is assumed they will be experienced equally
by each of the squadrons over the year and will not,
therefore, affect the analysis.
For squadrons transitioning to the F/A-18 during the
analyzed period, the first six months of fuel cost data is
deleted from the analysis. This is because of the potential
for higher costs as these squadrons progress through the
transition process with higher ground maintenance and pilot
training evolutions as they qualify the pilots and gain
maintenance expertise on the new aircraft.
The resulting squadron flight hour and adjusted fuel cost
data are provided in Figures 4-3 and 4-4, respectively.
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Month Unit MAG41 MAG42A MAG46 MAG49A VFA203 VFA204 VFA303 VFA305 VFC12 VFC13
October FY 1991 245 139 296 266.
November 48 7 349 561 453
December 704 548 779 741
January 963 805 1043 931
February 1325 1099 1340 1178
March 1577 1370 1605 1335
Apnl 1856 1641 1776 1399
May 2179 1911 73 1987 1592
June 22 2473 2090 115 2226 1904
July 69 2793 2384 233 2483 2095
August 99 3134 2770 356 2834 235S
September 215 3398 2967 477 3040 2645
October FY 1992 114 344 229 171 223 254
November 270 651 440 358 408 469
December c 449 828 595 549 631 666
January- 694 1056 21 794 666 864 96"
February 958 1320 73 1083 866 1042 1214
March 1151 1572 1-8 1314 1057 1370 1450
April 1287 1886 363 1534 1162 1568 1616
May 1500 2318 713 1936 1495 1729 1811
June 1745 2339 879 2084 1796 1939 1979
July 1901 2540 1026 2201 1910 2158 2200
August 2163 2775 1316 2365 2170 2490 2477
September 2330 2991 1513 2572 2310 2665 2723
October FY 1993 15 ISC' 296 209 151 137 216 249
November 46 481 SOt 437 3^9 455 428 441
December 121 686 ~26. 557 56.4 669 66" 579
January 193 874 940 818 766 906. 839 838
February 443 1041 1165 1027 1048 1081 1157 991
March 742 1336 1482 1285 1287 1262 143S 1260
April 981 1571 1727 1499 1519 1576 1701 1448
May 1245 1730 2067 1676 1724 1817 2003 1603
June 1455 2076 2356 1969 2082 2008 2261 1825 19
July 1721 2282 2571 2128 2288 2207 2591 2178 36 28
August 1956 2466 2855 2454 2450 2501 2760 2392 87 81
September 2110 2646 2930 2730 2613 2650 2933 2589 236 171
October FY 1994 289 215 194 205 191 221 182 240 55 41
November 497 470 44" 470 452 392 487 408 101 123
December 750 634 621 675 591 650 629 692 157 268
January 1025 828 662 798 711 925 862 863 237 476
February 1255 1032 1067 1013 1003 1120 1097 976 283 671
March 1500 1318 1286 1263 1222 1337 1356 1175 478 920
Apnl 1686 1489 1453 1478 1444 1614 1537 1332 668 1120
May 1864 1646 1749 1599 1593 1791 1799 1590 893 1349
June 2106 1861 2041 2021 1634 2162 2095 1805 1071 1640
July 2336 2175 2236 2226 1936 2444 2122 1835 1377 1981
August 2593 2383 2593 2419 2142 2736 2122 1844 1688 7779
September 2724 2550 2750 2600 2403 3005 2122 1844 1925 2435
Figure 4-3: Squadron Cumulative Flight Hours
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Month Unit MAG41 MAG42A MAG46 MAG49A VFA203 VFA204 VFA303 VFA305 VFC12 VFC13
October FY 1991 201635 157487 290080 297654
November 575634 387041 562122 486975
December 806080 603896 761862 675792
January 1016854 899185 1019011 1031548
February 1385950 1227583 1357420 1278130
March 1693698 1523440 1622655 1516560
April 2021184 1824792 1843488 1475945
May 2377289 2117388 68403 2052571 1708216
June 17534 2683205 2299000 125580 2270520 2096304
July 66375 3128160 2622400 245815 2550041 2260505
August 118503 3469338 3044230 376648 2899182 2528848
September 258430 3853332 3284469 525177 3106880 2782540
October FY 1992 117211 291108 190833 162370 193685 258174
November 266514 582232 375962 327746 344789 409549
December 430555 734704 516086 491651 528055 583744
January 650829 935775 17845 709195 600338 737239 790682
February 821946 1154225 55350 994021 748094 894016 990293
March 1099664 1359817 137887 1187535 934180 1169002 1181103
April 1241683 1591589 268065 1380960 996974 1323230 1325803
May 1375000 1787472 550650 1742854 1312512 1455039 1464529
June 1597535 1954657 689169 1868751 1585202 1645419 1637553
July 1827370 2161385 836937 1971083 1699272 1826195 1848826
August 2061451 2403697 1065775 2117952 1958603 2127606 2067074
September 2212406 2615370 1255506 2267103 2071408 2274008 2294735
October FY 1993 11164 151703 267852 168086 120632 88761 170709 228521
November 32217 387870 470887 371108 308054 337669 379507 366004
December 80338 561994 667845 462874 465067 493619 554255 473096
January 141784 696355 864703 672761 636544 687892 706205 684723
February 328763 849477 1061700 840253 893348 846232 997414 825656
March 588801 1117387 1341069 1052715 1094322 1001437 1218628 1052474
April 765648 1335804 1566469 1261741 1283456 1338368 1466379 1173845
May 1011946 1487674 1815100 1417905 1467745 1544975 1711709 1308081
June 1213798 1780762 2056265 1665785 1797057 1720283 1861972 1481420 16786
July 1481778 1893928 2249419 1736492 1967513 1893132 2169803 1807614 33572 26057
August 1686207 2073046 2500953 2126029 2109445 2099790 2308374 1972414 78354 75726
September 1807668 2247031 2579203 2318366 2255384 2264618 2462489 2134858 186263 164444
October FY 1994 204391 187042 187965 188169 189539 205786 160932 142703 40107 38303
November 407028 384437 423978 403610 414890 376208 449997 381161 85703 115285
December 610403 620098 594716 619582 606973 614533 576075 623188 138346 239710
January 836308 808999 648373 720275 716439 919811 778042 766622 224793 444687
February 1103325 1009371 1052309 901937 947249 1096583 993509 853067 274197 624807
March 1392147 1264904 1278786 1177664 1160308 1304956 1218807 1021010 462156 858542
April 1597444 1418384 1493752 1386803 1371100 1600008 1316757 1172377 668270 1076022
May 1754688 1554509 1719568 1501967 1515828 1791913 1577909 1407568 867043 1271266
June 2003976 1753762 2021225 1809728 1558174 2152078 1839669 1605263 1030039 1533789
July 2253805 2051887 2253104 2013730 1871829 2412842 1843900 1654401 1306079 1872000
August 2467383 2230701 2552009 2225332 2053524 2673216 1861214 1628663 1593999 2001694
September 2630931 2418664 2698113 2444875 2291489 2911525 1867706 1628663 1818001 2317037
Figure 4-4: Squadron Adjusted Fuel Costs (FY 1991 Dollars)
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D. ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY (OMA) COSTS
Organizational Maintenance Activity (OMA) costs are
incurred by the squadrons when squadron personnel conduct
local maintenance actions. Maintenance activity at the
squadron level can be categorized into two primary components:
• Scheduled preventive maintenance
• Unscheduled reactive maintenance
These components may have an impact on any or all three levels
of maintenance action, but they are the primary purposes of
OMA maintenance.
The preventive maintenance is scheduled on a cyclic
basis. Different maintenance requirements, such as cleaning,
lubrication and inspection actions, are due on 90, 128, or
244-day cycles for instance. Other maintenance requirements
may be based on the actual number of flight hours experienced
by the aircraft or the number of occurrences of a specific
event. Some maintenance inspections and maintenance actions
may be required after a certain number of overweight landings
or a specified number of arrested landings for instance.
These actions may lead to the discovery of equipment
malfunctions in need of minor additional maintenance efforts
or significant equipment replacement and overhaul
requirements, affecting higher levels of maintenance.
Significant equipment replacement usually necessitates the
additional cost and assistance from Intermediate level or
Aviation Depot Level maintenance activities.
The preventive maintenance requirements can be
anticipated in advance; however, the unscheduled maintenance
requirements make planning and budgeting more difficult.
Military aircraft are highly complex, interactive, mechanical,
hydraulic and electronic systems in a dynamic, high-stress
environment. With even the best preventive maintenance
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practices conducted by the highest trained personnel, the
equipment will fail seemingly without warning. In an effort
to predict high failure items and equipment of poor design,
maintenance trends are tracked and reported to the Aviation
Supply Office (ASO)
.
Maintenance trends or equipment/system failure analyses
are conducted primarily for the safety of the aircrews, but
they also have a tremendous impact in maintenance planning and
cost budgeting. Maintenance trend analysis and the resultant
life cycle adjustments have greatly impacted the F/A-18
Intermediate Level and Aviation Depot Level costs discussed in
the next two sections.
Like their Naval Reserve counterparts, some Reserve
Marine Corps F/A-18 units augment their organizational level
maintenance activities with Marine Aviation Logistic Squadrons
(MALS) or other active duty Marine squadrons. These units are
dedicated maintenance supply and squadron support or assist by
assuming some of the OMA maintenance actions. In an effort to
lessen the paperwork and part tracking load, they will also
sometimes transfer a part of the reserve costs onto other
active duty units by charging them for work done in support of
the Reserve unit. MAG-46 in San Diego, CA is assisted by
MALS-11, at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA. Without a
MALS readily available, the East Coast Marine F/A-18
squadrons, MAG-42A in Jacksonville, FL, and MAG-49A in
Washington, D.C., use an active duty counterpart, MAG-31, at
Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina in much the
same capacity. The exact effect, nature and breakdown of the
costs inadvertently transferred between the active duty and
reserve aviation units by the supporting units cannot be
precisely determined, but both OMA and some IMA costs are
affected to some degree.
Like the fuel costs in the previous section, the OMA
costs as reported by the squadrons are modified by
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COMNAVAIRESFOR to their cumulative Cost Per Hour (CPH) form.
Again, they must be adjusted for comparative purposes and, for
the purpose of consistency in the analysis, FY 1991 is used as
the base year. To prepare for the adjustment, the monthly
costs per hour are multiplied by the cumulative number of
flight hours reported for that month. This results in the
total OMA cost for the month. Then to compare across the
different Fiscal Years (FYs) , the cumulative monthly costs in
FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 are each adjusted by multiplying
by an inflation adjustment index from the NAVCOMPT 7111.
The indices from the NAVCOMPT 7111 [Ref . 21] which were
used are
:
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
1.026 1.0506 1.0748
The resulting inflation adjusted (to FY 1991) , cumulative
monthly OMA cost data is provided in Figure 4-5.
E. INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY (IMA) COSTS
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) costs are
incurred when aircraft system components fail and require
maintenance techniques and procedures unavailable at the
squadron level. Whereas the squadron maintenance effort and
OMA costs are primarily for "consumable" maintenance parts and
supplies, IMA costs are generally incurred for items and
system components considered to be economically repairable.
Therefore, maintenance procedures and capabilities requiring
the aid of specialized tools are obtained and systemized into
maintenance "work benches." These capabilities, or "benches,"
are maintained by a centralized IMA facility, the Aircraft
Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) , as a part of
aircraft base support for the squadrons. In addition to the
savings from repair vice replacement, the centralization of
these capabilities adds the dimension of "economies of scale"























































MAG41 MAG42A MAG46 MAG49A VFA203 VFA204 VFA303 VFA305 VFC12 VFC13
980 37947 31080 3724
4383 86203 83028 166251
6336 145220 122303 160797
54891 214130 196084 260231
58300 287938 191620 359290
63080 365790 258405 413850
92800 405327 296592 498044
100234 494949 133663 333816 600184
92862 103866 549670 176870 380646 656880
110920 106134 610304 204574 451906 750010
142263 106556 686960 228196 467610 816214
179095 112134 726915 250425 535040 878140
55444 1006 54237 59000 62162 58425
111316 12056 75478 95257 94246 149934
157981 12912 114825 162132 134072 215294
204277 18526 81544 178766 231737 220632 221049
241834 19298 126078 219556 261657 225462 294626
287189 26047 230047 265105 429599 272398 357554
426491 29411 336829 337899 618374 316351 396912
447368 31630 400976 366066 540590 338722 432451
484722 36476 532026 420456 596916 368523 499572
563259 64366 689000 461223 632943 433283 568226
592401 45980 711871 511725 666228 473246 601143
644951 46643 603135 541474 760994 490921 644921
24757 108452 1690 55702 68271 59072 94575 86982
47200 117205 3371 92757 106420 86184 107957 138521
70140 208294 4146 116108 146019 132450 145966 154863
94424 300318 5368 147935 211893 198344 219613 222541
137462 348784 7762 173024 249381 246945 262104 267889
166678 409473 8464 237283 308704 303908 307324 346602
197955 512900 16438 298202 368689 409526 359435 434152
226342 596097 17707 373295 433215 435831 434689 501986
301913 620468 22425 412317 455797 485467 505744 541976 73352
332537 679865 29366 552964 511784 506270 537634 576322 72810
355603 699475 40762 593295 559680 559428 567447 680761 73784
459918 750531 44622 636636 604377 592757 555556 722042 149381 89032
77837 39407 541 51689 62198 67238 71459 69969 24409 35629
115140 102326 4575 101889 98407 109416 132761 146528 85702 36964
173753 147469 7511 130001 118222 149981 157426 172549 158366 66077
226019 249602 8822 175221 170672 182453 178046 236867 201102 100532
273232 275571 9927 221488 214635 256345 194945 297849 278313 141717
330759 307795 15555 335433 247856 279689 223638 348739 280627 213993
343537 358812 17574 379539 290197 309345 254546 412687 372450 280313
374604 395114 19527 391270 327552 373264 279525 470432 401302 293697
391887 457112 24686 402395 378550 436504 333313 520608 465349 338742
447726 524121 27045 426643 399881 450234 335635 554871 518873 357607
528347 54770S 31363 490642 454388 547302 361301 566170 600592 374192
527160 640584 35821 510421 511990 617887 363275 566170 823874 432718
Figure 4-5: Cumulative Inflation Adjusted Monthly
Organizational Maintenance Costs (FY 1991 Dollars)
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To illustrate this concept with a typical example,
personnel at the squadron level are tasked with replacing
aircraft tire and wheel assemblies when the tires are worn out
of acceptable safety limits. Good assemblies are taken from
supply and the worn tires and wheels sent to AIMD for repair.
The AIMD maintains the tools and expertise to break down the
assemblies and replace the tire. When the repairs are
complete, the assemblies are maintained in a centralized base
supply as spares, and categorized as Ready For Issue (RFI) .
The squadron's IMA cost pool is charged for the repair of
a part when it is turned into AIMD and the replacement is
taken from supply. The cost charged to the squadron becomes
more complicated, however, if a replacement part is not
available from supply and the item is Beyond the Capability of
Maintenance (BCM) for repair at the AIMD level. In these
instances, the malfunctioning component, called a carcass, is
forwarded to a Naval Aviation Depot or, in some cases, back to
the original contractor for specialized inspection and repair,
or replacement. In this situation, the squadron's Aviation
Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) cost pool is charged for the
replacement /repaired part. Because the AVDLR charges are
generally much higher than the rates charged for IMA and
because of significant delays in getting the part returned,
reserve squadron maintenance managers, like many of their
active duty counterparts, will usually form a close working
relationship with the local AIMD Maintenance Officer and track
their repairable parts through the AIMD repair process. If
the part will be BCM'd at the local AIMD, but the capability
for repair is confirmed to exist at another base, whenever
possible the managers may elect to transport the part to the
other repair facility. Squadron maintenance managers will do
this to expedite the repair and return of the part and control
the cost of its repair. [Ref. 22] In any case, items at this
level can take as much as six months to fix and therefore may
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result in time lags of one to six months, or more, in the
final cost of repair determination.
For reserve squadrons at smaller bases with limited
support, this fluid aspect of the Intermediate level
maintenance system capability and cost structure causes the
unit's IMA costs to fluctuate more than any other pool of
costs. The IMA cost pool depends, more than any other cost
pool, on the repair capability of the host base and the
management ability of the squadron maintenance officers and
their ability to influence their base support. For the
reserve units at the larger active-duty bases however, the
relationships with base support and active duty units have
even more profound results which will be discussed in Chapter
V.
To prepare the IMA cost data for the analysis, it was
treated much the same as the Organizational Maintenance
Activity (OMA) data. That is, the COMNAVAIRESFOR cumulative
IMA cost per flight hour information for each unit was
multiplied by the cumulative number of flight hours to obtain
the total accumulating monthly IMA costs. These figures were
then translated into constant year FY 1991 dollars. This was
accomplished by dividing each year's data by the same
inflation indices from the NAVCOMPT 7111 Notice that were used
for the OMA cost pool and in the same manner.
As a final additional adjustment, each month's costs were
modified for the annual percentage change in the charges for
the Defense Business Operations Fund and its predecessor, the
Navy's Revolving Funds (stock fund and industrial fund)
.
These factors were also computed by the Navy Comptroller and
promulgated in the NAVCOMPTNOTE 7111. [Ref. 23] DBOF
industrial fund activities were established to serve the
operating forces on a revolving fund, reimbursement basis. It
collects all the costs of doing business and passes them onto
their customers, in this case, the F/A-18 units. Maintenance
58
rates are set and charged based on a prediction of the year's
level of business. The funds needed for conducting business
are taken from a revolving fund to be reimbursed by payments
from the customers as the work is completed. If the rates set
at the beginning of the year are incorrect, then the fund is
depleted or grows and the rates must be changed to attempt to
maintain a balanced level. The F/A-18 data must be adjusted
for this change in rate.
To illustrate, VFA-305's May 1994 IMA cost was found and
modified as follows:
($308 per Hr) (1590 Fit Hrs) = $384,738
(1.0748) (1.012*1.104*1.06)
Where: 1.0748 = The adjustment for inflation (to FY 1991
1.021 = The change in the FY 1992 DBOF rate
(to FY 1991 dollars)
1.104 = The change in the FY 1993 DBOF rate
(to FY 1992 dollars)
1.06 = The change in the FY 1994 DBOF rate
(to FY 1993 dollars)
Figure 4-6 contains the adjusted IMA cost data for all 10 Navy
Reserve F/A-18 squadrons for FY 1991 through FY 1994. The
regression analysis will use this data with the flight hour
data presented in Figure 4-3 to attempt to define the
relationship between this cost pool and the flight hours
flown
.
F. AVIATION DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLES (AVDLR) COSTS
Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) cost is incurred
when a part or component is Beyond the Capability of
Maintenance (BCM) at the intermediate, IMA, level. The AVDLR
cost pool is used when the component is sent to a specialized
repair depot, a NADEP, or the original contractor for repair
or replacement. At this level of repair, like the IMA level,
























































MAG41 MAG42A MAG46 MAG49A VFA203 VFA204 VFA303 VFA305 VFC12 VFC13
13230 14873 47952 7980
180190 37343 49929 58890
393536 53704 77121 44460
402534 67620 84483 81928
596250 103306 139360 150784
657609 152070 165315 300375
688576 155895 237984 352548
878137 179634 84023 282154 420288
128788 971889 254980 113275 333900 691152
107380 1041789 290848 122092 350103 670400
72963 1106436 343480 136704 385424 757239
35045 1236872 629004 167904 635360 894010
24484 68912 30215 7411 28135 34248
85292 119126 46614 14826 38509 220879
86054 196172 142115 120025 101489 352147
178461 286804 26576 181999 186655 139796 432228
223282 359776 62151 264932 206843 215764 604479
205078 484479 94459 320175 227014 283682 645182
250381 628478 105732 381169 313355 431901 874681
281707 714390 147639 402746 326843 452935 1001158
354609 853771 165927 485719 449730 489273 1092125
443067 1338114 192688 534186 487474 594415 1218324
524964 1411137 195186 699265 631159 673873 1350251
742773 1463364 215662 797625 671879 947100 1518442
5930 41251 24209 20120 54802 92440 9201 5728
8583 81548 169417 37230 112042 116291 65999 74766
16494 113381 214006 47928 134540 206323 30409 194845
29432 167536 406822 64324 234626 365092 135809 127080
52638 208416 433731 115493 285709 403379 137999 156192
89765 268616 499984 126991 353059 412861 184604 234013
117007 343971 622366 306497 421879 482018 284036 345414
260926 417105 656844 371245 480284 517028 288390 361903
290063 454541 732624 387499 560507 538874 414145 365379 12189
319632 460762 792910 422416 561386 601680 465761 424919 24378 13335
408270 495813 882929 434861 563564 713792 569033 450367 51291 38782
476367 532004 938574 502377 609962 785666 574716 489664 26942 82602
54101 38849 26215 22548 43216 72575 45898 32431 12358 1127
77310 108189 60051 170960 84870 95162 228030 100648 18806 16041
96043 93142 92696 252953 140685 180773 295013 98401 25409 46531
124817 147663 132733 261430 222874 210745 346732 131531 34260 57216
141979 209178 195316 284911 392416 234934 360247 181725 36463 95415
172053 332382 280868 381009 513620 380239 412884 208623 39055 222616
360283 360298 299078 361120 560417 412101 519229 312890 55754 266611
396855 411220 453441 391940 642022 437596 580885 384738 82785 106065
466578 481016 439350 404877 793336 587691 656710 426836 72361 262840
607460 550214 541052 494913 800033 614424 696649 462762 137390 317367
745591 560242 692625 581533 900306 664189 756864 514288 145457 338659
785398 645079 725920 655685 993016 722408 756864 563543 293393 353906
Figure 4-6: Cumulative Inflation Adjusted Monthly Intermediate
Maintenance Costs (FY 1991 Dollars)
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instance, replacing a component without a carcass, especially
if the replacement part is new from the contractor, can be
much more expensive than a repair of the carcass (the used,
broken component). Therefore, costs at this level also
depend heavily on the management ability of the maintenance
officer to track the components in need of repair and ensure
that the most economical avenues are used to return mission
essential parts and supplies.
Tracking malfunctioning components through an AIMD then
through the AVDLR pipelines can be a daunting task. The
active duty bases and the reserves, both Naval Air Reserve
units aboard active duty bases and the stand-alone Naval Air
Facilities, have separate part tracking systems. These
systems rarely communicate and the potential for a lost or
delayed part and incorrect charges to the unit's AVDLR account
are common. The Naval Air Facilities, frequently located a
fair distance from the repair facilities, must ship their
parts and await their return, creating time lags, complicating
part tracking and prolonging the repair process.
Depending upon the criticality of the component, the
depots may also hold onto the carcasses, waiting for an
economical number of them to repair in a batch process. In the
interim, the squadron is usually billed the price of a
replacement, to be modified downward when the repairs are
completed and costs accurately determined. These lags and
price changes all complicate the process of assigning a
specific cost to a given month and the associated flight hours
flown for that month.
Because of the consistent nature of Reserve flight
operations the lags would normally be assumed to average out
over the period of the analysis. Beginning in March 1992,
however, major changes were made to the engine life cycle
limitations for the F/A-18 F-404 engine and its component
parts. Because of these changes, the reserve units supported
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by the Naval Air Stations had to remove more components more
often because they had already exceeded the new life-cycle
limitations. The components of the F-404 engine were already
making up the majority of the squadron AVDLR costs and, during
a period of fiscal austerity, the sudden increase in costs due
to the engine life reductions resulted in the budget
shortfalls that are still a part of COMNAVAIRESFOR ' s budgeting
problems. The projected FY 1995 budget shortfalls amounted to
over $40 million and are primarily attributable to the
increase in AVDLR costs. [Ref. 24] Table 3-1, a brief
synopsis of the engine life cycle changes for the fiscal years
1992 through 1994 was provided in Chapter III.
The effects of the engine life-cycle changes on the AVDLR
cost pool were so severe that the method for preparing the
regression analysis data was changed. The effect of inflation
on the cost pool is still considered, however the costs are
then adjusted for the net effect of the engine life changes in
addition to the increased charges in the DBOF
.
To prepare the data provided by COMNAVAIRESFOR and
recorded in Appendix C, the cumulative AVDLR costs were
multiplied by the cumulative flight hours for that month.
This resulted in the total cost charged to the unit's AVDLR
cost pool for that month. In order to compare these multi-
year costs to each other, again, requires an adjustment for
inflation. Dividing by the inflation indices provided by
NAVCOMPT Note 7111 and used for the OMA and IMA costs changes
the costs to constant year dollars. Again, the base year
selected was FY 1991.
To obtain the costs shown in Figure 4-7 required
modifying the constant year dollar figures for two primary
additional effects: 1) the annual increase in the Defense
Business Operating Fund charges, or when available the
increased rate for engine repair, and 2) the increased use of
























































MAG41 MAG42A MAG46 MAG49A VFA203 VFA204 VFA303 VFA305 VFC12 VFC13
67375 96968 59792 41496
202592 240112 212058 273159
432960 320032 335749 203034
507501 406525 465178 515774
719475 541807 576200 823422
738036 779530 694965 768960
836912 869730 907536 1166766
c 1263820 945945 41318 1031253 1330912
198484 1394772 1118150 88090 1237656 1591744
165613 1293159 1268288 230437 1340820 1573345
181962 1614010 1457020 298328 1666392 1896636
198660 1773756 1646685 323683 1836160 2258830
90731 102242 100128 105818 168417 231755
181473 167610 193180 203750 239578 546677
272577 264794 607930 333285 342023 690992
420057 456955 33693 720159 477113 396508 888991
c 525325 683286 125564 943148 556239 543147 902595
634278 791010 149386 1018490 616853 540849 1112115
826651 971160 187511 1353923 901724 790414 1242353
917390 1118224 247984 1477870 983211 1066817 1848720
1209108 1276266 441507 1611557 1377489 1226168 1802107
1373872 1475431 474560 1803439 1321710 1477729 2158374
1612073 1606923 577785 1841673 1729030 1657834 2235454
1925977 1702281 664780 2100456 1838493 1824906 2472224
2815 122958 117572 38467 174550 245174 42898 20469
43001 183006 273501 98551 338576 272746 238502 247671
70772 495057 397167 129260 316749 534863 400077 499554
151916 648531 536856 300513 932170 914163 557863 721796
229780 780022 778014 460225 1159604 998731 874516 759139
489587 1015645 1002652 623517 1420310 1259600 1067939 1234668
513831 1337153 1285248 799327 1706177 1603958 1351282 1613788
627656 1549256 1341295 1036363 1945217 1718373 1468793 1773707
772689 1807759 1374576 1200352 2287056 1951593 1792859 1979518 18425
888911 1806191 1561736 1359206 2285312 2006532 2261870 2440044 18411 17457
1052979 1856746 1715557 1438893 2336619 2101429 2889275 2632808 69663 50735
1112857 2178990 1826701 1640445 2395129 2313376 2946624 2627395 123613 75759
69526 65423 102350 19869 107397 126880 151941 106079 14658 29790
83359 206607 142572 309023 280876 200542 564242 290694 28430 30438
106461 285673 204259 444737 398939 459770 772217 401946 70149 64646
140916 373087 275233 508225 663463 549921 686137 514621 98461 105649
185477 566096 294114 697725 1089345 648595 933921 596429 124307 196720
263960 744723 346967 709953 1215058 848172 1071173 732172 199117 220709
544127 839297 435471 723880 1243232 695178 1225045 857929 256463 332590
556728 922701 629381 889210 1492516 1126879 1466898 1042664 290656 440930
715143 1078403 810219 1281563 1644866 1276511 1276085 1246816 360003 540555
973089 1206031 946035 918852 1659127 1389855 1402497 1292907 390450 646359
1274430 1320064 1212045 1031775 2028236 1547231 1490016 1356823 412768 713293
1369710 1429458 1363681 1078594 2160572 1687098 1515543 1365795 396310 1001776
Figure 4-7: Cumulative Inflation, Life-cycle and DBOF Rate
Adjusted Aviation Depot Level Repairable Costs
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decreases. Considering the cost of the engine life-cycle
limitations, deducting their cost impact allows a better
comparison of the costs before and after the engine life-cycle
changes. Since the life-cycle changes are not temporary, the
analyst may decide to include the life-cycle costs in the
final model. Should this be the case these operations should
not be done to estimate future costs. However, for comparison
purposes, the final total costs should include consideration
of the engine life-cycle limitations.
To perform these mathematical adjustments, the
assumptions made and factors considered were that:
• The engines, already the largest cost in the AVDLR
pool, with the decreased life-cycle times, had in
effect become the AVDLR pool.
• Non-engine related components stayed consistent in
repair frequency over the four years.
• Like the other cost pools, percentage increases in the
DBOF charge rates are applied equally to all parts and
components inducted into the system.
To calculate the impact of the life-cycle reductions, the
percentage decrease in each subcomponent of an engine
component's life-cycle was found. This decrease was then
multiplied by a fraction describing its occurrence during the
fiscal year to give the annual net effect of the change on
subcomponents life-cycle. The subcomponents, within an engine
component, were then combined based on the percentage of the
original hourly life-cycle. This resulted in an annual life-
cycle change, in percent, for a specific engine component. To
illustrate, the First Stage (subcomponent) of the engine Fan
section (major component) decreased, in June 1992, to 2700
hours between maintenance actions from the original 5850
hours. Therefore, the net life-cycle effect is:
(5850 hrs - 2700 hrs) * (3 months left in FY) = 13.46% effect of
(5850 hrs) * (12 months in the FY) change in hrs
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The 13.46% is then multiplied by the original percentage of
the total component hours between maintenance actions to
weight it
.
These weighted percentage changes in subcomponent
life-cycles were then added to obtain the change in life-cycle
for the component. To continue the illustration:
(13 .46%) (5850 hrs) + 8.87% + 4.07% + = 15.75 :
(5850 + 8770 + 4380 + 9030)
For the next fiscal year the effect is modified for the
number of months it is in effect in that year. If the
subcomponent does not have another life-cycle reduction then
the previously computed annual reduction carries through for
the entire year. With a subsequent life-cycle reduction, the
new reduction effect based on the original hours is computed
for the portion of the year that it affects and is added to
the previous percentage reduction to determine the net effect
over the entire fiscal year.
After finding the percentage change in each component's
life-cycle for a given year, they are weighted based on
original cost for the component, then added together for the
net percentage change in the F-404 life-cycle. The original
cost of the components was used to weight the changes based on
the assumption that the cost ratios were a good predictor of
relative component complexity and importance to the F-4 04
engine life-cycle performance. The data provided by
COMNAVAIRESFOR is then divided by one plus the computed
percentage for the given year to modify the cost pool for the
cost effect of decreasing the engine subcomponent life-cycles.
The final aspect of the AVDLR cost pool to be considered
is the change in the DBOF rate for work performed. The
NAVCOMPT 7111 provides the percentage rate increases over the
prior year for AVDLR level work performed. These rates,
however are not specific to the F/A-18. In an in-house
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Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, Naval Air
Station Cecil Field report, it was noted that the AVDLR costs
to repair an engine rose from an average of $74,000 in FY 1993
to $136,000 in FY 1994. [Ref . 25] This is an increase of
approximately 87% and was used to modify the FY 1994 data to
FY 1993, then the percentage rate increases promulgated via
the NAVCOMPT 7111 were used to account for cost increases in
the process of translating to FY 1991 dollars.
G. SUMMARY
In this chapter, the four cost pools: Fuel,
Organizational Maintenance Activity, Intermediate Maintenance
Activity, and Aviation Depot Level Repairables, were
described. The data provided by Commander Naval Air Reserve
Force, New Orleans for ten Navy and Marine Corps reserve units
flying the F/A-18 from FY 1991 to FY 1994 were mathematically
prepared for the next step: regression analysis.
The data was first modified for the effect of inflation.
Since 48 months of data formed the database, the costs in
subsequent years were deflated to their FY 1991 value. In the
case of fuel costs, which are determined by an annual
contract, the adjustment was for the difference in the
contract. The effect of inflation was included in the
contracted costs. Each maintenance cost pool was then
adjusted for identifiable changes in DBOF rate changes and
engine life-cycle changes as identifiable and appropriate to
enhance the comparability of the data between the years.
One final aspect of aircraft operations that could not be
defined in the first two cost pools, but which does have an
effect, is the increased life-cycle costs. As the aircraft
ages, there is an increase in maintenance costs at the OMA and
IMA levels, just as at the AVDLR level. As the engines age,
increased fuel consumption as a result of falling fuel
efficiencies may even have an effect on costs.
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The goal of modifying the data explained in this chapter
was to prepare it for analysis. For the analysis to provide
usable results, any and all external forces and trends
affecting the costs not related to the independent flight hour
variable need to be mathematically deleted. In this manner
the effect of flight hours on the costs can be identified.





In this chapter, the cost data provided by Commander
Naval Air Reserve Force (COMNAVAIRESFOR) is analyzed using the
method of regression analysis. Section B of this chapter
describes the output from the regression analysis program and
its usefulness for defining the relationships between the
data. The following section delineates the analysis of the
fuel cost data and describes the results of its analysis. The
next sections are then devoted to each of the individual
maintenance cost pools reported to COMNAVAIRESFOR, discussing
the regression outputs for each, their meaning and usefulness.
Any necessary assumptions and data characteristics impacting
the analysis are noted in the applicable data section. The
final section provides a chapter summary.
B. REGRESSION OUTPUTS
For each regression operation seven outputs are available
from the Lotus spreadsheet program. These outputs are
important for judging the degree of fit of the regression line
to the observations and for writing the regression equation.
The seven outputs are:
• The Constant: The point where the regression line
crosses the Y-axis, (B ) .
• The Standard Error of the Y Estimate: The square root
of the sum of the squared differences between the
estimated Y value represented by the regression line
and the observed value, (Y - Ye ) , divided by the
number of degrees of freedom.
• R-Squared (R2 ) : An indication of fit, this value
indicates how much variation in the dependent variable
is explained by the independent variable.
• Number of Observations: The number of data pairs in
the analysis.
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• Number of Degrees of Freedom: The number of data pairs
minus the number of independent variables.
• The X Coefficient: An indication of the slope of the
regression line. Positive is upward sloping and
negative downward sloping. The higher the coefficient
the steeper the slope, (M)
.
• Standard Error of the X Coefficient: The square root
of the sum of the squared differences between the
observed data point and the regression line divided by
the degrees of freedom.
The precepts of linear regression analysis used to model
the ties between flight hours and costs are based on the
assumption of a linear relationship. If the relationship is
in fact curvilinear over the range being analyzed, there is
almost no limit to the number of equations that can be used to
describe the data. The equations may be defined as parabolas
or hyperbolas in their simple form, cubic form, or any of a
myriad of combinations. For the purpose of simplifying the
analysis, the data will be assumed to be linear over the range
of the data being analyzed. Visual analysis of the data is
the easiest method for confirming this assumption. Also a
poor R 2 is an indicator that the assumption may not be true.
Assuming the relationship is linear, the equation:
Y = MX + B
describes the relationship between the independent value, X,
and the dependent value Y. The X value represents the number
of flight hours and the Y value the corresponding cost. This
"basic" linear equation can then be modified for the
difference in the actual, or observed, value of the dependent
variable (Y ) and the expected value from the regression line
(Ye ) :
(Y - Y e ) = MX + B - Ye
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The difference in the Y values is also known as the deviation
error term or the residual. [Ref. 26: p 3] The standard
deviation of the differences in the observed costs is provided
as the Standard Error of the Y Estimate. It and the Standard
Error of the X Coefficient can be used in simple equations to
aid in determining the degree to which the regression equation
quantifies the relationship between the variables.
The degrees of freedom (i.e., the number of observations
less two) is also used in a number of equations to evaluate
the regression equation. It implies that, for simple (two
variable) regression analysis, two degrees of freedom are used
in constructing the regression line leaving the rest to
explain the variance in the equation. This is because with
just two points a perfect regression line, going through both
points, can be described. [Ref. 27: p. 32]
The coefficient of determination, or R 2
,
is the only
output immediately usable for determining the degree of fit
described by the regression equation. It is expressed as a
percentage and describes the proportion of variation in the
dependent variable that can be explained by the independent
variable within the context of the regression equation. [Ref.
28: p. 11] Therefore, the closer the value of R 2 is to one
(100%) , then the better the fit between the dependent and the
independent variables. This implies that the resulting
regression equation, constructed from the X coefficient and
the Y-axis intercept, is representative of the relationship
between the variables.
C. FLIGHT HOURS VERSUS FUEL COSTS
As described in Chapter IV, Figure 4-3 contains the
cumulative number of flight hours flown by the end of each
month for the ten squadrons. The following figure, Figure 4-
4, lists the adjusted, cumulative fuel cost data, on a monthly
basis, for each of the units. This adjusted fuel cost was
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found by dividing the reported fuel cost (from Appendix C) by
the appropriate annual index listed in Figure 4-2. Since FY
1991 was the base year, no calculations were required for the
information in this year. For example, MAG-46's October 1991
(FY 1992) fuel cost of $248,024 (reported by COMNAVAIRESFOR as
344 flight hours with fuel costs of $721 per hour) was
adjusted as follows:
(344 Fit Hrs)X($721 per Hour) = $291,108 in FY 1991 terms
(.8520 Cost Escalation Index)
These calculations were accomplished for each of the costs in
Figure 4-4. The result is a table containing the monthly
cumulative fuel costs for each squadron in terms of FY 1991
dollars. Given the assumptions listed, these costs can be
used for regression analysis.
The regression program was run with the flight hours as
the independent variable along the X-axis and the fuel costs
as the dependent variable on the Y-axis. Except for the
number of degrees of freedom and the number of observations,
the output generated by the spreadsheet program is summarized
in Table 5-1.
The coefficient of determination, R 2 , values range from
1.000 to .938 indicating a high percentage of the variation in
the cost of fuel is caused by the change in flight hours. The
FUEL COSTS VERSUS FLIGHT HOURS
Dnit: Constant Std Err
of Y Est
R Squared X Coaf Std Err
of Coaf
MAG41 -149320.56 76655.64 0.989 994 .44 26.77
MAG4 2A -1582.60 85342.15 0.984 906.56 20.51
MAG4 6 -22571. 93 205643.62 0.950 971.54 33.02
MAG4 9A -26864.59 70070.63 0.989 891.54 18.43
VFA2 03 -25211.68 164601.03 0.959 973.41 29.80
VFA2 04 -49262.69 105991.15 0.981 936.43 22.85
VFA3 03 -16293.19 136900.64 0.968 912.69 24.29
VFA3 05 1971.25 166812.57 0.938 901.95 34.12
VFC12 5168.25 10722.89 1.000 949.10 5.74
VFC13 -10714 .15 13477.13 1.000 952.50 6.90
Table 5-1: Regression Output for Flight Hours Verses Fuel
Costs
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average of .976 implies that only 2.4% of the variation in
fuel costs is a result of other causes. These unknown
variations may be caused by the different engine efficiencies
for the different missions and the fuel used for ground
maintenance operations which does not add to the flight hour
total. In addition, there are mathematical variances induced
by purchasing non-contract fuel at significantly higher
prices. Finally, the average is improved by the data from the
two VFC squadrons. The low number and relative consistency of
the observations for these two units resulted in 1.00 for
their coefficients of determination. All the data from these
two units are from the same Fiscal Year, FY 1994, and are
unaffected by outside influences such as Desert Storm, fuel
price hikes, and the like which tend to cause willful
manipulation of flying habits (operational tempo) and fuel
purchases to meet year-end budgets.
D. FLIGHT HOURS VERSUS OMA COSTS
Table 5-2 summarizes the results, minus the number of
observations and the degrees of freedom, of the regression
analysis of flight hours and Organizational Maintenance
Activity (OMA) costs. To conduct the analysis, the inflation
adjusted OMA costs from Chapter IV, Figure 4-5, were assumed
to be dependent upon the intensity of the flight hours.
Therefore, the OMA costs were analyzed on the Y-axis with
flight hours on the X-axis. The table includes the Marine
units, although their costs are affected by their use of the
active duty MALS and MAGs and, to a lesser degree, their
transition process. The first six months after their
transition date were not considered for the analysis. With R2
values around 49% and 58% respectively, the relationship
between MAG-46 and MAG-49A costs in terms of the flight hours
flown by these units, are not described by the regression line
very well. If only the last two years data is considered for
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MAG-42A, MAG-46, and MAG-49A, the regression values that
result are much improved:
Constant:
Std Error of the Y Est:
R Squared:
Z Coefficient:
Std Error of the X Coefficient:
MAG-42A MAG-4 6 MAG-49A
16776.91 -4687.41 -4517.42




These results indicate a more accurate capture of the OMA to
flight hour relationship. The perturbations caused by the
data from FY 1991 and FY 1992 may have been caused by the
inadvertent cost transfers, the transition programs, or other
unidentified historical supply and maintenance considerations.
Since the cost relationship cannot be accurately determined
during the earlier time frame, this data will be excluded from
further analysis.
At approximately 75%, the R 2 for VFA-204 suggests a poor
relationship or fit between flight hours flown and the
resulting costs generated in the OMA cost pool. In performing
the initial analysis of the squadrons transitioning to the
F/A-18 during the four year period under study, again only the
first six months were excluded. This was to allow for the
generally poor material condition of the aircraft transferred
to the transitioning units. Generally, units transitioning
receive their aircraft from other units which frequently balk
at transferring their better aircraft, since these aircraft
are relied upon for their own performance. In addition, the
OMA COSTS VERSUS FLIGHT HOURS
Dnit: Constant Std Err
of Y Est
R Squared X Coef Std Err
of Coef
MAG41 26175.11 20140.76 0.978 185.70 7.03
MAG42A 19952.10 51262.62 0.935 265.16 12.32
MAG4 6 -7965.36 23196.85 0.488 24.68 3.72
MAG4 9A 54360.06 135570.93 0.580 209.52 35.65
VFA2 03 5758.79 35050.06 0.965 225.19 6.35
VFA2 04 52843.77 103187.27 0.746 218.84 22.24
VFA3 03 24641 .71 37926 .64 0.935 173.62 6.73
VFA3 05 -67.19 63024.04 0.917 290.33 12.89
VFC12 133149.16 46377.51 0. 953 315.60 24 .84
VFC13 61324 .59 29483.78 0.938 154.88 15.10
Table 5-2: Regression Output for Flight Hours Verses OMA
Costs
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transitioning squadron may incur higher costs depending upon
the schedule and timing of the receipt of their aircraft. If
the unit is restricted to a small number of aircraft for an
extended amount of time, the increased utilization rate may
dictate more maintenance, more often, because of wear and tear
on the aircraft and the cyclic nature of the maintenance
actions. Considering these possibilities in the case of VFA-
204 and deleting the first year's data results in an R2 of
.81. This result has improved, but it is probably still being
influenced by the cumulative nature of the data and the high
costs early in the year. By restricting the analysis to the
last two years' data, FY 1993 and FY 1994, the following
regression output results:
Constant: 17781.84
Std Error of the Y Est: 23560.98
R Squared: .98
X Coefficient: 213.47
Std Error of the X Coefficient: 6.46
The regression line for the last two years' data describes the
relationship between OMA cost and flight hours to the same
degree as the other units in the analysis.
Finally, the R 2 values for VFC-12 and VFC-13, .95 and
.94, appear to indicate that the relationship between their
OMA costs and flight hours is described well by the regression
line. However, the low number of observations is a concern,
especially when considered with the impact on maintenance
costs as a result of transitioning. It may be that both
squadrons are still in the high cost phase of unscheduled
maintenance before falling to a steady state level. This may
also be signaled by the relatively high standard error in the
X Coefficient, 24.84, for VFC-12. For this reason these
squadrons will not be considered for further analysis.
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E. FLIGHT HOURS VERSUS IMA COSTS
To identify the relationship between flight hours and the
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) cost pool, the
adjusted IMA cost information found and listed in Chapter IV,
Figure 4-6 and the flight hours, Figure 4-3, was used. The
results of the regression analysis, again minus the number of
degrees of freedom and the number of observations, is shown in
Table 5-3.
Given the negative influences: time lag, wide cost
variances in repair verses replace, maintenance management's
ability to liaison with AIMD and cost shifting to active duty
units at some repair facilities, the results of regression
analysis are understandably lower. However the wide disparity
in VFA-203, VFA-303, and VFA-305 require an additional
explanation
.
These three reserve units are the only units directly
supported by active duty F/A-18 bases: NAS Cecil and NAS
Lemoore, and their supply systems. The central focus of these
shore installations is the deploying, active duty units. This
focus directly affects the IMA and the Aviation Depot Level
Repairables, as discussed in the next section of this chapter.
The best example and one of the primary cost drivers at these
IMA COSTS VERSUS FLIGHT HOURS
Dnit: Constant Std Err
of Y Est
R Squarad X Coaf 3x3 &r
of Cbaf
MAG41 -152303.65 71027.92 0.906 307.85 24 .m.
MAG42A -32675.36 52413.47 0.924 247.60 12 .60
MAG4 6 -86267.49 155758.55 0.840 388.30 25.
a
MAG4 9A -9621.07 76175.04 0.820 213.45 20.a
VFA203 3611.20 168689.11 0.593 250.03 3051
VFA2 04 8373.72 53480.23 0. 941 263.79 IIS
VFA3 03 -13034.27 140089.90 0.644 225.47 25.01
VFA3 05 -134845.34 220507.26 0.641 409.15 4 5.11
VFC12 -12961.96 36802. 04 0.822 119.84 19.71
VFC13 38214 .88 43936.51 0.843 138.09 22 33
Table 5-3: Regression Output for Flight Hours Verses IMA
Costs
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two levels are the F/A-18 General Electric F-404 engines.
Squadrons in final preparation for deployment obtain a higher
supply precedence and receive engines and engine components
with lower life-cycle hours. That is, these parts have more
flight time remaining until they must be turned in for
preventive maintenance and reconditioning. Typically, non-
deploying units, like the reserves at these bases, receive the
high-time "turn-ins" from the deploying units. Although
certified by the maintenance depots, these parts frequently
require more maintenance, and of course must be removed more
often as their hours expire. The prevailing logic supporting
this policy is that the reserves will typically fly fewer
hours than the active duty in any given period of time and so
do not incur a higher rate of engine changes than their active
duty counterparts.
Beginning in March 1992, the Aviation Supply Office (ASO)
began decreasing the engine life-cycle limitations for the
F/A-18 F-404 engines. The sudden increase in cyclic engine
maintenance requirements and the deployment cycles of the
active duty units has affected both IMA and AVDLR costs for
these three units and resulted in the lower regression values.
Because NAS Cecil Field, Jacksonville, FL directly supports
VFA-2 03 and NAS Lemoore , CA directly supports VFA-3 03 and
VFA-305 (prior to their decommissioning) with IMA and AVDLR
maintenance, the IMA maintenance costs for these three units
was affected the most by the changes. The precise effect of
the changes can not be quantified for the IMA cost pool,
because it is not known exactly which components were
influenced and to what degree they were influenced.
These changes affect the analysis of the data for these
units because the changes occurred in the middle of the period
being analyzed. After the "bow-wave" effect of the changes
smooth out, modifying the data for its affect will not be
required. Then the only adjustments required will be for
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inflation and any identifiable DBOF rate changes. The
increased use of the IMA capabilities and costs will be the
same across all the units.
F. FLIGHT HOURS VERSUS AVDLR COSTS
Table 5-4 provides the result of the regression analysis
program for flight hours and the Aviation Depot Level
Repairables cost pool . The data used for the analysis is
shown in Figure 4-3 (flight hour costs) and Figure 4-7 (AVDLR
costs) in Chapter IV.
A further inspection of the adjusted data for VFA-204
shows significantly lower costs charged to the AVDLR cost pool
in FY 1994. The lower costs for this last year of the
analysis and the correspondingly higher mid-year (FY 1993)
costs drive the R 2 to its low value. Graph 5-1 shows the
annual AVDLR costs versus flight hours for this unit. A
number of reasons could account for this variation, each
illustrating the difficulty in modeling this cost pool for
squadrons in their unique environments. The reasons include:
A new Maintenance Officer able to use cost saving
alternatives to the AVDLR maintenance system.
AVDLR COSTS VERSUS FLIGHT HOURS
Unit: Constant Std Krr
of Y Est
R Squared X Coaf Std Krr
of Coaf
MAG41 -227682.41 196816.34 0.798 54 6.7 9 68.74
MAG42A -124385.18 194072.20 0.893 763.89 46.63
MAG4 6 -102553.26 160150.25 0.916 576.56 25.72
MAG4 9A -48352.12 151919.95 0.885 555.19 39.95
VFA203 65820.80 336459.45 0.777 771.17 60.92
VFA2 04 60408.27 358679.59 0.679 646.09 77.32
VFA3 03 -104500.87 290357.44 0.822 749.81 51.52
VFA3 05 -209572.44 231887.59 0.904 988.78 47.44
VFC12 85069.65 61898.93 0.897 199.13 23.84
VFC13 -116100.69 61898.93 0.960 409.86 31.70
Table 5-4: Regression Output for Flight Hours Verses AVDLR
Costs
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FLIGHT HOURS VERSUS AVDLR COSTS
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Graph 5-1: Annual AVDLR Costs for VFA-2 04
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• Less influence from the engine life-cycle changes as a
result of the unit's remote location from active-duty
units. VFA-204 is located in New Orleans, LA.
• Improved aircraft condition, resulting in less demand
on the AVDLR maintenance and cost systems.
• Mathematically, the failure to fully capture F/A-18
cost increases in FY 1993 because of the blanket data
source, NAVCOMPT 7111 DBOF rates.
Of note, an inspection of VFA-204' s two other maintenance cost
pools, OMA and IMA, indicates a slight decrease in cost for FY
1994, but a high degree of consistency in the other years.
This implies the different methods to compute the DBOF rate
changes and the effect of the engine life-cycle changes are
probably having the most profound effects.
G . SUMMARY
A simple regression output from a Lotus Database program
was the tool used to define the relationships between the four
cost pools and squadron flight hours. The techniques used in
preparing the data for analysis were applied consistently to
all four of the cost pools and yielded fairly consistent,
definable results.
Because the Reserves fly almost exclusively from contract
fuel sites, only rarely purchasing non-contract fuel, the
regression analysis supported an extremely close relationship
between fuel and flight hours.
The OMA costs for each squadron were also found to be
closely defined by the amount of flying accomplished by the
squadron. Since OMA costs primarily consist of consumable
parts used as a function of flight hours, landings, or other
cyclic processes, the results were not totally unexpected.
The final two cost pools showed more variation and are
therefore the most difficult to model. This is however
consistent with expectations, as OMA and AVDLR consist of more
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complex maintenance actions, conducted on a more periodic
basis. Finally, these two levels are also affected by widely
varying time lags and price variances which compound the
difficulty in both managing and modeling costs.
Although there are many factors that affect aircraft
operational maintenance and fuel costs, the level of flight
operations is a good indicator of cost. The next chapter,
Chapter VI, explores the conclusions of this research and
presents some topics for further study.
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to better understand the factors affecting
Flight Hour Program costs, this thesis used the mathematical
technique of regression analysis to define cost trends within
four cost pools of ten Naval Reserve F/A-18 squadrons. The
four cost pools- -Fuel, Organizational Maintenance Activity
(OMA) , Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA), and Aviation
Depot Level Repairables (AVDLR)--are an integral part of the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) used to
resource the Navy's and Naval Reserve's Flight Hour Program.
The database, provided by Commander Naval Air Reserve Force,
New Orleans, LA, consisted of these four cost pools and
cumulative flight hour data for Fiscal Years 1991 through
1994. The objective of the database analysis was to support
the null hypothesis that the number of flight hours, as an
independent variable, could be used to estimate the level of
the four cost pools, the dependent variables.
B. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
Flight hours was determined to be only one of many
identifiable influences affecting fuel and the three levels of
maintenance cost. The research and analysis found that there
are different factors affecting the four cost pools;
therefore, each cost pool will be addressed separately.
1. Fl'ight Hours and Fuel Costs
The analysis of fuel costs and flight hours supported the
assertion that the two are closely related. After modifying
the costs for inflationary effects by adjusting them for the
yearly fuel contract cost, without exception, the fuel costs
varied directly with changes in the flight hours. A tight fit
was found in the data.
Typically, the fuel loads are scheduled by the squadron
for the mission to be flown. If not, the mission pilot or
83
Mission Commander for multi-flight taskings will usually
inform maintenance of the required fuel load prior to
pref lighting the aircraft. Since the aircraft performance is
highly weight sensitive and extra fuel represents a decline in
performance, only the amount of fuel required for mission
accomplishment is loaded. The required fuel load is computed
using the mission type and duration in flight hours. Since
the squadron purchases its fuel as it is loaded aboard the
aircraft prior to flight, the close tie between flight hours
and fuel cost is not entirely unexpected.
At the end of the fiscal year, each unit attempts to
maximize the number of flight hours flown by spending to the
limit of its budget for fuel. If there is funding available
on 30 September, but no flight hours, then aircraft may be
fueled and not flown, carrying the cost over into the new
fiscal year. Certain maintenance procedures require grounded
engine tests, with no intention for flight and no flight hours
logged. Although typically small compared to the total annual
budget, these two situations and the differences in engine
efficiencies for the various missions represent the sources of
variance in the relationship between fuel and flight hours.
In this analysis, the engine efficiencies were assumed to be
the same across the different squadrons. However, in
determining a net relationship for all the units, a variance
will exist between the two variables. The same is true when
running the engines for squadron ground maintenance
operations. This variance, with maintenance costs, was found
to have a noticeable impact within approximately six months of
transitioning to the aircraft. Therefore, a six month grace
period was allowed for the generally poor material condition
of aircraft sent to units transitioning to the F/A-18.
The results of an analysis of all the data for each year
and all four years reinforce the findings for the individual
units. In Table 6-1, the R2 for the all-year, cumulative data
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is significant at 96%. Given the fuel contract cost, the
annual cost to fuel F/A-18 flight requirements can be found
with a high degree of confidence.
2. Flight Hours and OMA Costs
Within a relevant operating range, the magnitude of the
Organizational Maintenance Activity (OMA) cost has been shown
to be closely related to flight intensity. Representing the
first level of maintenance conducted at the operating or
squadron level, the OMA cost pool consists largely of
expenditures for consumable items. Typically, the
consumables- -oil , rags, filters, etc. --are replaced on a
cyclic basis defined by the number of landings or the number
of flight hours. The cyclic nature and controllability of the
cost pool by squadron maintenance managers results in a
strengthened correlation between squadron flight hours and the
OMA cost pool
.
It is expected that the closer the expenditures are to
the operational level, the closer the tie will be between cost
and an operational metric like flight hours. Even at this
level of expenditure, however, the various units exhibit
differing efficiencies as defined by their Cost Per Hour
(CPH) . MAG-46 was able to maintain their reported OMA costs
at a consistently, and significantly, lower level than the
other nine squadrons. Taking advantage of their location,
with nearby ranges and Navy aircraft carriers, and the savings
provided by an active-duty Marine Aviation Logistics Support
unit at MCAS El Toro, MAG-46' s CPH was a factor of ten lower,
causing this unit to be dropped from the analysis.
A primary concern for the future is the question of
whether or not MAG-46 will be able to continue at these lower
cost levels. The pressure is on every unit to identify and
save costs. How much longer can the active duty MAGs and
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Table 6-1: Combined Squadron Annual and Multi-year Regression
Analysis Results
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On a per squadron basis, the resulting R2 over the years
analyzed proved to be very high, averaging approximately .95.
When the squadrons are compared with each other on an annual
or on a mult i -year basis, as shown in Table 6-1, more variance
is introduced, although the R2 remains fairly high. This
demonstrates the impact of the management ability of the
responsible maintenance personnel. It is a relative statement
of their ability to control cost.
Proper maintenance and operator practices can have a big
effect on this level of cost. Proper operation extends
equipment life and, with proper maintenance practices, further
cost efficiencies are realized. Although other factors may
affect the result as well. One factor is luck, as no
maintenance manager or operator can control an occasional
broken windscreen or the like.
Looking at the R 2 s that result from the individual years
without the influence of MAG-46, FY 1991 was affected by the
low number of observations which amplified the squadron
efficiency variances. FY 1992 was affected by the transition
costs, which were not totally factored out by deleting the
first six months after transition from the analysis. FY 1993
was a stable year, with only one transitioning unit, and
resulted in a high R 2 at about .9. FY 1994 was less stable,
as shown by a .71 R 2 , with two transitioning units and two
other units decommissioning, both of which impact managers at
the squadron level. Given the various unit manager cost
management efficiencies, the net OMA costs can be predicted
with a fair degree of confidence.
3. Flight Hours and IMA Costs
Intermediate Maintenance Activity level maintenance is
subject to the greatest range in usage and costs. A wide
variety of aircraft systems are repaired at a wide range of
costs. The situation is further complicated by the different
bases providing a variety of repair capabilities. When
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consideration is given to the differing management abilities
at the squadron and IMA level, this level of maintenance cost
appears to be totally uncontrolled and unpredictable. The R2
seems to bear this out with consistently lower results. The
R 2 for the multi-year regression is .66, and the highest R2 was
for FY 1993 at .79. Further analysis of the data, however,
yields an explanation for the lower trend, as compared to the
Fuel and OMA results.
One of the squadrons was picked at random and the data
inspected for potential cost lags. As has already been
discussed in Chapter IV, costs and repairs can lag up to as
much as six months, driving the costs back. These costs can
be shifted into another fiscal year; although, in an effort to
control and manage their costs, most managers attempt to
minimize this occurrence. Of course, this, in and of itself,
is an effect on the IMA costs. To conduct the check for time
lags, the data for VFA-303 was mathematically distilled into
a non- cumulative, monthly form. The monthly costs were
shifted back one month and regressed with the monthly flight
hours. Because of the autocorrelation 1 effects inherent in
a time series analysis, the results would be expected to
change. Therefore, the results of two new regression analysis
operations were used for the comparison. The monthly, non-
cumulative figures were regressed without a lag and the
results compared to a regression of the non-cumulative data
with just a one month lag. The result of the analysis implied
that there was a significant effect caused by time lag: the R2
improved approximately 20%. Because of the variability in
Autocorrelation is the effect in successive observations
caused by errors that are carried forward through the data.
That is, a follow-on observation is biased by an error in the
earlier data upon which it is dependent. Therefore, it gives
less information about the trend in the relationship it is
representing, and the reliability of the analysis decreases.
[Ref. 28: p. 212]
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this aspect of costing, however, the exact effect of the cost
lag is very difficult to specify in a model.
Considering the variable nature and wide range of
maintenance charges and the potential effects caused by
significant one to six month lags in the IMA costs, the
results of the regression analysis of this level are fairly
predictive. With low standard deviations of the coefficients,
the multi-year model represents a fair degree of correlation
in the relationship between flight hours and IMA costs, which
can be predicted with some confidence.
4. Flight Hours and AVDLR Costs
Over the time period of the analysis, the Aviation Depot
Level Repairable cost pool related to the F/A-18 has endured
dramatic changes caused by variations in the "customer" usage
rate. Although the rate structure used for costing the
maintenance performance at the depot level has remained
consistent and easily quantifiable, dramatic changes in the
F/A-18 General Electric F-404 engine component life-cycles
have complicated the analysis process.
Making up a significant portion of the aircraft AVDLR
maintenance cost, the F/A-18 engines are a critical cost
component. The specific effects of the engine life-cycle
changes on the depot level usage rate were difficult to
quantify due to a general lack of specific data. The extent
of the engine life-cycle reduction cost effects were still
unknown, primarily because the life-cycle changes were an
ongoing process. Finally, data for changes in FY 1994 was
difficult to obtain as the impact of these changes has not
been fully identified, and the life-cycles continue to change.
With the data that was available, fairly reasonable
approximations of the effect on cost could be predicted for
the changes in the F-404 engine life-cycle. Again however,
time lags exist in AVDLR costs and these are difficult to
quantify. Management abilities and attempts at cost control
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are much more difficult at this level for operational squadron
maintenance managers. They are usually too far removed from
the depot level maintenance/pricing decision making.
Also like the IMA level, the regression analysis of all
the squadrons in a given year indicates the stability of the
database in FY 1993 yielded the best results. The variances
caused by decommissioning and transitions have a significant
impact. Given the instability of the costing environment, the
result of the multi-year regression analysis indicates a
fairly consistent relationship between flight hours and AVDLR
costs. With time and fewer changes in engine component life-
cycles, and as indicated by the low standard deviation in the
coefficients, reasonable confidence can be assumed in
predicting AVDLR costs based on a relationship to flight
hours
.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
While researching the Flight Hour Program and analyzing
the four maintenance cost pools, a number of areas needing
further study were revealed. Concentrated effort in these
areas might lead to a deeper insight in the relationships
between budgeting, budget execution, maintenance and
operations for both active and reserve units.
Dwindling fiscal resources demand that operational and
budget managers at every level adapt proven cost efficient
methods to maximize the remaining funding. Further
investigation into MAG-46JS consistently lower Organizational
Maintenance Activity costs may yield techniques or processes
of cost management applicable to other active duty and reserve
F/A-18 units. There is a need to define this unit's
relationships with its support units and identify the precise




Research for this thesis indicated a trend in the Air
Force moving toward two level maintenance. The Air Force also
uses a maintenance squadron concept, removing the aircraft
from the flying units and giving responsibility for aircraft
maintenance to an entirely different unit devoted to
maintenance. In an era of increasing complexity and "black
box" repair, one or both of these ideas could result in
significant cost savings. Some of the basic repair capability
(computer card replacement for instance) could be consolidated
at the operational level and the more technically complex
repairs shifted to the depot level. When combined with the
maintenance squadron concept, the cost savings gained from the
economies of scale and fewer levels of maintenance may be
significant
.
As a result of the cancellation of a number of
replacement aircraft programs, fleet aircraft are growing
older. As in the case of the P-3C "Orion," Navy aircraft are
being operationally flown well beyond their originally
intended service life. The replacement aircraft procurement
programs for the P-3C and the A-6 "Intruder" have been
canceled and follow-on aircraft will not be operational until
sometime in the far future. The increasing age of these
aircraft have costs in terms of increased maintenance and
repair. Parts are more difficult to find and must be replaced
more often. Research is needed to quantify the increase in
maintenance and repair costs related to aircraft age at every
level of maintenance.
Finally, the potential effects of the IMA and AVDLR cost
lags was not fully investigated. An indepth analysis of the
IMA and AVDLR maintenance and pricing systems and their effect
on the squadron budget should be pursued. The use of non-
cumulative quarterly data may provide a better model for
identifying a relationship to flight hours.
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D. CONCLUSION
The methods used for defining and committing the resource
requirements needed to ensure the continued freedom of the
people of the United States are long and involved. Six year
POMs result in two year defense budgets that are debated and
negotiated for a year before being ratified and signed into
law. The critical nature of its purpose ensures that the
defense budget will be planned, programmed and executed in the
most efficient manner possible. Ultimately, the defense
budget is the tool that guarantees the freedom of the United
States while safeguarding, to the maximum extent possible, the
lives of the soldiers, sailors, and Marines tasked with policy
implementation on the front lines.
This parametric analysis of the variances and costs
associated with a significant portion of the Navy's budget,
the Flight Hour Program, was intended to add insight and
understanding of the various costing nuances and budget
interactions that impact Reserve tactical aviation.
Predicting the future is difficult. However, incremental
increasing, or decreasing, budget requests based on a "gut
feel" of the future is no longer an acceptable planning
method. With parametric models and analysis, given a level of
operational intensity, the required level of resources to
operate and succeed can be confidently obtained.
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APPENDIX A: REVISED BUDGET ACTIVITY STRUCTURE
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY
BUDGET ACTIVITY 1: OPERATING FORCES
O AIR OPERATIONS
• MISSION AND OTHER FLIGHT OPERATIONS 1A1A
• FLEET AIR TRAINING 1A2A
• INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 1A3A
• AIR OPERATIONS AND SAFETY SUPPORT 1A4A
• AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE 1A5A
• AIRCRAFT DEPOT OPERATIONS SUPPORT 1A6A
• BASE SUPPORT 1A7A
O SHIP OPERATIONS
• MISSION AND OTHER SHIP OPERATIONS 1B1B
• SHIP OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND TRAINING 1B2B
• INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 1B3B
• SHIP DEPOT MAINTENANCE 1B4B
• SHIP DEPOT OPERATIONS SUPPORT 1B5B
• BASE SUPPORT 1B6B
O COMBAT OPERATIONS /SUPPORT
• COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS 1C1C
• ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1C2C
• SPACE SYSTEMS AND SURVEILLANCE 1C3C
• WARFARE TACTICS 1C4C
• OPERATIONAL METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY 1C5C
• COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES 1C6C
• EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE 1C7C
• DEPOT OPERATIONS SUPPORT 1C8C
• BASE SUPPORT 1C9C
O WEAPONS SUPPORT
• CRUISE MISSILE 1D1D
• FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE 1D2D
• IN-SERVICE WEAPONS SYSTEMS SUPPORT 1D3D
• WEAPONS MAINTENANCE 1D4D
• BASE SUPPORT 1D5D
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BUDGET ACTIVITY 2 : MOBILIZATION
O READY RESERVE AND PREPOSITIONING FORCES
• SHIP PREPOSITIONING AND SURGE 2A1F
O ACTIVATIONS/ INACTIVATIONS
• AIRCRAFT ACT IVATIONS/INACTIVATIONS 2B1G
• SHIP ACT IVAT IONS/INACTIVATIONS 2B2G
O MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS
• FLEET HOSPITAL PROGRAM 2C1H
• INDUSTRIAL READINESS 2C2H
• COAST GUARD SUPPORT 2C3H
BUDGET ACTIVITY 3 : TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT
O ACCESSION TRAINING
• OFFICER ACQUISITION 3A1J
• RECRUIT TRAINING 312J
• RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS 3A3J
• BASE SUPPORT 3A4J
O BASIC SKILLS AND ADVANCED TRAINING
• SPECIALIZED SKILLS TRAINING 3B1K
• FLIGHT TRAINING 3B2K
• PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION 3B3K
• TRAINING SUPPORT 3B4K
• BASE SUPPORT 3B5K
O RECRUITING AND OTHER TRAINING AND EDUCATION
• RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING 3C1L
• EXAMINING 3C2L
• OFF-DUTY AND VOLUNTARY EDUCATION 3C3L
• CIVILIAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING 3C4L
• JUNIOR ROTC 3C5L
• BASE SUPPORT 3C6L
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• CIVILIAN MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
• MILITARY MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
• OTHER PERSONNEL SUPPORT
• SERVICEWIDE COMMUNICATIONS
• BASE SUPPORT
O LOGISTICS OPERATIONS AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT
SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION
PLANNING, ENGINEERING AND DESIGN
ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
AIR SYSTEMS SUPPORT
HULL, MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL SUPPORT
COMBAT/WEAPONS SYSTEMS

















O INVESTIGATIONS AND SECURITY
IDENTIFIED OUTSIDE DON)
PROGRAMS :not
• NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
• CONSOLIDATED CRYPTOLOGIC PROGRAMS









O SUPPORT OF OTHER NATIONS
• INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS AND AGENCIES 4D1Q
O MEDICAL ACTIVITIES (FOR REIMBURSABLE E/S FROM OSD (HA)
)
• MEDICAL ACTIVITIES 4E1R
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OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY RESERVE
BUDGET ACTIVITY 1: OPERATING FORCES
O AIR OPERATIONS
• MISSION AND OTHER FLIGHT OPERATIONS 1A1A
• AVIATION TRAINING 1A2A
• INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 1A3A
• AIR OPERATIONS AND SAFETY SUPPORT 1A4A
• AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE 1A5A
• AIRCRAFT DEPOT OPERATIONS SUPPORT 1A6A
• BASE SUPPORT 1A7A
O SHIP OPERATIONS
• MISSION AND OTHER SHIP OPERATIONS 1B1B
• INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 1B3B
• SHIP DEPOT MAINTENANCE 1B4B
• BASE SUPPORT 1B6B
O COMBAT OPERATIONS/SUPPORT
• COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS 1C1C
• COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES 1C6C
• BASE SUPPORT 1C9C
O WEAPONS SUPPORT
• WEAPONS MAINTENANCE 1D4D
BUDGET ACTIVITY 4: ADMINISTRATION AND SERVICEWIDE ACTIVITIES
O SERVICEWIDE SUPPORT
• ADMINISTRATION 4A1M
• EXTERNAL RELATIONS 4A2M
• MILITARY MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 4A4M
• OTHER PERSONNEL SUPPORT 4A6M
• BASE SUPPORT 4A7M
• WEAPON SYSTEM SUPPORT 4A8M
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OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS
BUDGET ACTIVITY 1: OPERATING FORCES
O EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
• OPERATIONAL FORCES 1A1A
• FIELD LOGISTICS 1A2A
• DEPOT MAINTENANCE 1A3A
• BASE SUPPORT 1A4A
O USMC PREPOSITIONING
• MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE 1B1B
• NORWAY PREPOSITIONING 1B2B
BUDGET ACTIVITY 3 : TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT
O ACCESSION TRAINING
• OFFICER ACQUISITION 3A1C
• RECRUIT TRAINING 3A2C
• BASE SUPPORT 3A3C
O BASIC SKILLS AND ADVANCED TRAINING
• SPECIALIZED SKILLS TRAINING 3B1D
• FLIGHT TRAINING 3B2D
• PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION 3B3D
• TRAINING SUPPORT 3B4D
• BASE SUPPORT 3B5D
O RECRUITING AND OTHER TRAINING AND EDUCATION
• RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING 3C1F
• EXAMINING 3C2F
• OFF-DUTY AND VOLUNTARY EDUCATION 3C3F
• CIVILIAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING 3C4F
• JUNIOR ROTC 3C5F
• BASE SUPPORT 3C6F
BUDGET ACTIVITY 4 : ADMINISTRATION AND SERVICEWIDE ACTIVITIES
O SERVICEWIDE SUPPORT
• ADMINISTRATION 4A1G
• LOGISTICS SUPPORT 4A2G
• SPECIAL SUPPORT 4A3G
• SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION 4A4G
• BASE SUPPORT 4A5G
Q7
98
APPENDIX B: MEMO FLIGHT HOUR COST REPORT
From: Unit sending report
To: COMNAVAIRESFOR
Info: Interested commands /units being reporting upon
UNCLAS//N07310//
SUBJ: MEMO RECORD FLIGHT HOUR COST REPORT (RPT SYM 7310-7)
REF A: COMNAVRESFOR P7100 (BUDGET AND FINANCIAL GUIDANCE MANUAL!



























List of the units contained in the report
Type/Model/Series and four digit Technical
Equipment Code
Year and Month of the reported data
Flight hours dedicated to training
Flight hours dedicated to operational tasking
Flight hours used in interservice support
operations
Flight hours flown in support of drug
interdiction operations
Total of D.l. through D.4.
Total spent for fuel
Total spent for Organizational Maintenance
support
Total spent for Intermediate Maintenance support
Total spent for Depot Level Repairables
Consumption of fuel in barrels (42 gal/bbl)
Cost of type of fuel used by Air Force Bases
Cost of type of fuel used at Naval Air Stations
Cost of type of fuel used at Naval Air Stations
Fuel obtained not covered under Navy contracts
Cost of non-contract fuel
Flight hours flown in support of other agencies
for which reimbursement of costs will be received
Total cost of above flight hours
Cost per hour (cumulative) year-to-date
Cost per hour for monthly costs and hours
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FLT HRS FUEL OMA IMA AVDLR
c
:
15 695 1734 464 258
46 654 1078 219 1285
121 620 609 160 804
193 686 514 179 1082
443 693 326 140 713
742 741 236 142 907
981 729 212 140 720
1245 759 191 246 693
1455 779 218 234 730
1721 804 203 218 710
1956 805 191 245 740
2110 800 229 265 725
269 745 311 256 752
497 803 249 198 488
750 798 249 163 413
1025 800 237 155 400
1255 862 234 144 430
1500 910 237 146 512
1686 929 219 272 939
1864 923 216 271 869
2106 933 200 282 988
2336 946 206 331 1212
2593 933 219 366 1430
2724 947 208 367 1463
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Unit:MAG46/42A









June 22 797 4221 5854 9022
July 59 1125 1880 1820 2807
August 99 1197 1437 737 1838
September 215 1202 833 163 924
October FY 1992 114 876 499 223 881
November 270 841 423 328 744
December 449 817 361 199 672
January 694 799 302 267 670
February 958 731 259 242 607
March 1151 814 256 185 610
April 1287 822 340 202 711
May 1500 781 306 195 677
June 1745 780 285 211 767
July 1901 819 304 242 800
August 2163 812 281 252 825
September 2330 809 284 331 915
October FY 1993 180 787 633 269 939
November 481 753 256 199 523
December 686 765 319 194 992
January 874 744 361 225 1020
February 1041 762 352 235 1030
March 1336 781 322 236 1045
April 1571 794 343 257 1170
May 1730 803 362 283 1231
June 2076 801 314 257 1197
July 2282 775 313 237 1088
August 2466 785 298 236 1035
September 2646 793 298 236 1132
October FY 1994 215 853 197 230 1156
November 470 802 234 293 1279
December 634 959 250 187 1311
January 828 958 324 227 1311
February 1032 959 287 258 1596
March 1318 941 251 321 1644
April 1489 934 259 308 1640
May 1646 926 258 318 1631
June 1861 924 264 329 1686
July 2175 925 259 322 1616
August 2393 914 246 298 1605




















































T HRS FUEL OMA IMA AVDLR
245 823 4 54 275
487 1192 9 370 416
704 1145 9 559 615
963 1058 57 418 527
1325 1046 44 450 543
1577 1074 40 417 468
1856 1089 50 371 452
2179 1091 46 403 580
2473 1085 42 393 564
2493 1120 38 373 463
3134 1107 34 354 515
3398 1134 33 364 522
344 721 3 208 329
651 762 19 190 285
828 756 16 246 354
1056 755 18 282 379
1320 745 15 283 573
1572 737 17 320 557
1886 719 16 346 570
2318 657 14 320 534
2339 712 16 379 604
2540 725 26 547 643
2775 738 17 528 641
2991 745 16 508 630
296 845 6 96 546
506 869 7 393 743
726 859 6 346 752
940 859 6 508 788
1165 851 7 437 918
1482 845 6 396 930
1727 847 10 423 1023
2067 820 9 373 892
2356 815 10 365 802
2571 817 12 362 835
2855 818 15 363 826
2930 822 16 379 857
194 950 3 172 1535
447 930 11 171 928
621 939 13 190 957
862 965 11 196 929
1067 967 10 233 802
1286 975 13 278 785
1453 1008 13 262 872
1749 964 12 330 1047
2041 971 13 274 1155
2236 988 13 308 1231
2593 965 13 340 1360
2750 962 14 336 1443
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Unit:MAG41A/49A
















January 21 724 3984 1314 1776
February 73 646 1772 884 1904
March 178 660 1326 551 929
April 353 647 979 311 588
May 713 658 577 215 385
June 879 668 621 196 556
July 1026 695 689 195 512
August 1316 690 555 154 486
September 1513 707 409 148 501
October FY 1993 209 751 280 113 253
November 437 793 223 100 310
December 557 776 219 101 319
January 818 768 190 121 505
February 1027 764 177 132 616
March 1285 765 194 116 667
April 1499 786 209 240 733
May 1676 790 234 260 850
June 1969 790 220 231 838
July 2128 762 273 233 878
August 2454 809 254 208 806
September 2730 793 245 216 826
October FY 1994 205 900 271 140 282
November 470 842 233 463 1913
December 675 900 207 477 1917
January 798 885 236 417 1853
February 1013 873 235 358 2004
March 1283 900 281 378 1610
April 1478 920 276 311 1425
May 1599 921 263 312 1618
June 2021 878 214 255 1845
July 2226 887 206 283 1201
August 2419 902 218 306 1241




















































,T HRS FUEL OMA IMA AVDLR
139 1133 273 107 712
349 1109 247 107 688
548 1102 265 98 584
805 1117 266 84 505
1099 1117 262 94 493
1370 1112 267 111 569
1641 1112 247 95 530
1911 1108 259 94 495
2090 1100 263 122 535
2384 1100 256 122 532
2770 1099 248 124 526
2967 1107 245 212 555
229 710 243 137 484
440 728 176 110 486
595 739 198 248 1131
794 761 231 238 1004
1083 782 208 254 964
1314 770 207 253 858
1534 767 226 258 977
1936 767 194 216 845
2084 764 207 242 856
2201 763 215 252 907
2365 763 222 307 862
2572 751 216 322 904
151 746 475 426 1589
379 759 295 347 1228
564 770 272 280 772
765 777 291 360 1675
1048 796 250 320 1521
1287 794 252 322 1517
1519 789 255 326 1544
1724 795 264 327 1551
2082 806 230 316 1510
2288 806 235 288 1373
2450 804 240 270 1311
2613 806 243 274 1260
191 973 350 288 1636
452 900 234 239 1808
591 1007 215 303 1964
711 988 258 399 2715
1003 926 230 498 3160
1222 931 218 535 2893
1444 931 216 494 2505
1593 933 221 513 2726
1634 935 249 618 3285
1936 948 222 526 2794
2142 940 228 535 2755
2403 935 229 526 2616
105
Unit:VFA-204








May 73 1121 1831 1151 566
June 115 1092 1538 985 766
July 233 1055 878 524 989
August 356 1058 641 384 838
September 477 1101 525 352 679
October FY 1992 171 809 354 45 685
November 358 780 273 43 630
December 549 763 303 227 672
January 666 768 357 291 793
February 866 736 310 248 711
March 1057 753 417 223 646
April 1162 731 564 280 859
May 1495 748 371 227 728
June 1796 752 341 260 849
July 1910 758 340 265 766
August 2170 769 315 302 882
September 2310 764 338 302 881
October FY 1993 137 605 453 792 2460
November 455 692 199 300 824
December 669 689 208 362 1099
January 906 709 230 473 1387
February 1081 731 240 438 1270
March 1262 741 253 384 1372
April 1576 793 273 359 1399
May 1817 794 252 334 1300
June 2008 800 254 315 1336
July 2207 801 241 320 1251
August 2501 784 235 335 1155
September 2650 798 235 348 1200
October FY 1994 221 913 327 418 1267
November 392 941 300 309 1129
December 650 927 248 354 1561
January 925 975 212 290 1312
February 1120 960 246 267 1278
March 1337 957 225 362 1400
April 1614 972 206 325 1224
May 1791 981 224 311 1391
June 2162 976 217 346 1303
July 2444 968 198 320 1255
August 2736 958 215 309 1248
September 3005 950 221 306 1239
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Unit:VFA-3 03
MONTH FLT HRS FUEL OMA IMA AVDLR
October FY 1991 296 980 105 162 202
November 561 1002 148 89 378
December 779 978 157 99 431
January- 1043 977 188 81 446
February 1340 1013 143 104 430
March 1605 1011 161 103 433
April 1776 1038 167 134 511
May 1987 1033 168 142 519
June 2226 1020 171 150 556
July 2483 1027 182 141 540
August 2834 1023 165 136 588
September 3040 1022 176 209 604
October FY 1992 223 740 286 131 836
November 408 720 237 98 650
December 631 713 218 167 600
January 864 727 262 168 508
February 1042 731 222 215 577
March 1370 727 204 215 437
April 1568 719 207 286 558
May 1729 717 201 272 683
June 1939 723 195 262 700
July 2158 721 206 286 758
August 2490 728 195 281 737
September 2665 727 189 369 758
October FY 1993 216 738 460 50 273
November 428 828 265 181 766
December 661 783 232 54 832
January 839 796 275 190 914
February 1157 805 238 140 1039
March 1435 793 225 151 1023
April 1701 805 222 196 1092
May 2003 798 228 169 1008
June 2261 769 235 215 1090
July 2591 782 218 211 1200
August 2760 781 216 242 1439
September 2933 784 199 230 1381
October FY 1994 182 867 422 321 2429
November 487 906 293 596 3371
December 629 898 269 597 3572
January 862 885 222 512 2991
February 1097 888 191 418 2477
March 1358 880 177 387 2295
April 1537 840 178 430 2319
May 1799 860 167 411 2408
June 2095 861 171 399 1775
July 2122 852 170 418 1923
August 2122 860 183 454 2043
September 2122 863 184 454 2078
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Unit:VFA-305
MONTH FLT HRS FUEL OMA IMA AVDLR
October FY 1991 266 1119 14 30 156
November 453 1075 367 130 603
December 741 912 217 60 274
January 931 1108 301 88 554
February 1178 1085 305 128 699
March 1335 1136 310 225 576
April 1399 1055 356 252 834
May 1592 1073 377 264 836
June 1904 1101 345 363 836
July 2095 1079 358 320 751
August 2359 1072 346 321 804
September 2645 1052 332 338 854
October FY 1992 254 866 126 140 1010
November 469 744 328 489 1295
December 686 725 322 533 1115
January 961 701 236 467 1024
February 1214 695 349 517 823
March 1450 694 253 462 849
April 1616 699 252 562 851
May 1811 689 245 574 1130
June 1979 705 259 573 1008
July 2200 716 265 575 1086
August 2477 711 249 566 999
September 2723 718 243 579 1005
October FY 1993 249 857 367 27 113
November 441 775 330 199 772
December 579 763 281 395 1186
January 838 763 279 178 1184
February 991 778 284 185 1053
March 1260 780 289 218 1347
April 1448 757 315 280 1532
May 1603 762 329 265 1521
June 1825 728 312 235 1491
July 2178 775 278 229 1540
August 2392 770 299 221 1513
September 2589 770 293 222 1395
October FY 1994 240 583 403 172 1286
November 408 916 386 314 2073
December 692 883 268 181 1690
January 863 871 295 194 1735
February 976 857 328 237 1778
March 1175 852 319 226 1813
April 1332 863 333 299 1874
May 1590 868 318 308 1908
June 1805 872 310 301 2013
July 1835 884 325 321 2050
August 1844 866 330 355 2144
September 1844 866 330 389 2155
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Unit:VFC-12

































June 19 825 4056 753 1333
July 38 825 2013 753 666
August 87 841 891 692 1101
September 236 737 665 134 720
October FY 1994 55 715 477 286 786
November 101 832 912 237 819
December 157 864 1091 206 1300
January 237 930 912 184 1209
February 283 950 1057 164 1278
March 478 948 631 104 1212
April 689 951 581 103 1083
May 893 952 483 118 947
June 1071 943 467 86 978
July 1377 930 405 127 825
August 1668 937 387 111 720
September 1925 926 460 194 599
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Unit:VFC-13


































July 28 869 559 857
August 81 873 562 861
September 171 898 547 567 609
October FY 1994 41 916 934 35 2114
November 123 919 323 166 720
December 268 877 265 221 704
January 476 916 227 153 647
February 671 913 227 181 853
March 920 915 250 308 698
April 1120 942 269 303 864
May 1349 924 234 185 951
June 1640 917 222 204 959
July 1961 936 196 206 959
August 2222 923 181 194 934
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